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Abstract
The present thesis analyzes current developments in nuclear disarmament,
specifically the humanitarian impact initiative that culminated in the adoption of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, the Treaty) by 122 members of the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly in July 2017. Through academic research and six
interviews with people directly involved in the process, I traced the humanitarian initiative
from its first conference in Oslo in 2013 all the way to the Treaty negotiations in 2017. My
argument is that the humanitarian initiative constitutes a novel approach to nuclear
disarmament, spearheaded by small and medium-sized states, with overwhelming support
from the Global South and in defiance of nuclear-armed states and major powers. Its
advocates bypassed the standstill in existing disarmament frameworks such as the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) and succeeded in changing the discourse around nuclear weapons, pointing out flaws
in nuclear deterrence theory and raising awareness of the unacceptable suffering caused by
any use of these weapons. The humanitarian initiative owes a large part of its success to
the close collaboration and exchange between like-minded states and civil society actors
such as the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) and the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In my assessment of the prospects of
the TPNW, I take into consideration that the Treaty’s immediate aim is not to eliminate
nuclear weapons, but rather to stigmatize and delegitimize them in order to raise the
political and reputational costs of retaining them. The examples of the Ottawa Convention
(on anti-personnel landmines) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions have demonstrated
that perceptions and norms change over time as more states ratify the relevant treaties.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Two reasons have prompted me to examine the humanitarian impact initiative and
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. First and foremost, the timeliness and
urgency of the issue, and second, my fascination with the inner workings of negotiation
processes and the road to outcomes in multilateral fora. My access to people directly
involved in the negotiation process has provided me with the opportunity to gain first-hand
insights into these processes. Rather than nuclear security in the technical sense, for which
I might lack the science background, I envision negotiation and advocacy strategies as my
future area of expertise, which could be applied to the disarmament context as well as to a
range of other contexts.
With the threat posed by nuclear weapons at its most acute since the end of the Cold
War, the need to effectively address nuclear disarmament is greater than ever. The
humanitarian impact initiative, which culminated in the adoption of the TPNW, is one of
several options for addressing the danger and the humanitarian consequences of any
nuclear weapons detonation. The Norwegian Nobel Committee confirmed the timeliness
and significance of the issue and endorsed ICAN’s approach to it by awarding ICAN the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2017.
From the point of view of International Relations (IR) research, the TPNW is of
great interest because of its novel approach to a longstanding issue. Previously, the
international community relied on the initiative and cooperation of the nuclear-armed states
to tackle nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The new Treaty, however, was
brought about by civil society in collaboration with non-nuclear-armed small and medium5

sized states, without the support of the five permanent members of the Security Council
(P5) recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) in the NPT. Moreover, the TPNW
prohibits any possession and use of nuclear weapons for all its signatories and bases this
prohibition on humanitarian grounds. On the premise that the devastating consequences of
nuclear weapons affect all of humanity, the humanitarian initiative reframed the nuclear
weapons discourse by steering it away from military security and towards ethics and human
security. This novel approach to nuclear disarmament, by defying great power politics and
following an independent process outside existing disarmament structures, marks a
precedent in nuclear security.
The present thesis argues that the humanitarian initiative and the Treaty
negotiations were successful because of their open, inclusive and egalitarian nature and
because of the close and effective collaboration between state actors and civil society.
Success, in this case, is measured by the Treaty’s ability to deliver on the declared aim of
its facilitators – to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons as an instrument of national
security by declaring them incompatible with the principles of international humanitarian
law and by demonstrating that the majority of states consider them illegal. An egalitarian
process was achieved by overcoming the double standards of the NPT regime (that allow
five powerful nations to possess nuclear weapons while requiring everyone else to
renounce them) and giving non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) the capacity to act through
the majority-based voting system of the General Assembly. The openness of the process
enabled close collaboration and coordination between civil society and like-minded states.
Their initiatives complemented each other and reinforced their joint potential. The Treaty’s
impact on the nuclear regime will convey important lessons about bottom-up initiatives in
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international security and about the continuing significance of great-power politics in a
multipolar world.
The present thesis is structured as follows: The first chapter provides an
introduction to the topic and the author’s argument. The second chapter is dedicated to a
review of existing academic literature on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the
campaigns for the prohibition of landmines and cluster munitions as models for the
humanitarian initiative, the role of small states and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) in international security as well as the TPNW itself. The third chapter analyzes the
status quo of nuclear weapons control frameworks in 2010, in order to provide a better
understanding of the discontent that fueled the humanitarian initiative. The fourth chapter
is dedicated to the multilateral process that began with the conferences in Norway, Mexico
and Austria and continued in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) in 2016. Chapter
Five analyzes the discourse strategies employed by advocates of the humanitarian initiative
for the purpose of stigmatizing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons and countering the
nuclear deterrence theory. These strategies draw heavily on international humanitarian law
and on the lessons learned from previous humanitarian disarmament initiatives. Chapter
Six examines the roles played by the different state, civil society and UN actors as well as
the crucial collaboration among these actors. The seventh chapter attempts to reconstruct
the dynamics of the 2017 negotiating conferences, the contributions of the different actors
and the evolution of the Treaty text. The principal provisions of the Treaty and their
significance are discussed as well. The eighth chapter examines how the Treaty was
received by various nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states, by their respective civil
societies and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It further discusses the
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ratification process, the implementation of the Treaty, and its impact on the international
nuclear regime. The conclusion recapitulates the author’s findings, provides
recommendations on their practical application and points out avenues for further research.
For this thesis, the author conducted a qualitative analysis of three main sources:
existing academic literature, primary sources and documents, as well as interviews with six
people directly involved in the humanitarian initiative, the Treaty negotiations and/or the
preparatory process. Written sources include conference papers, statements and records
from the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons; the report of
the OEWG; the final documents of the NPT Review Conferences; position papers by select
member states; UN General Assembly drafts, resolutions and voting records; drafts,
working papers and other documents emanating from the negotiating conferences; as well
as publications by ICAN, the ICRC and other civil society organizations. The author
conducted open-ended interviews with Allison Pytlak of the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), one of ICAN’s main NGO partners; Ambassador
Alexander Kmentt, one of the major architects of the humanitarian impact initiative at the
inter-state level; George-Wilhelm Gallhofer, Counsellor at the Austrian Mission to the UN,
who attended the negotiating conferences and worked on the TPNW in the First Committee
of the General Assembly; Tsutomu Kono, Senior Political Affairs Officer in the Weapons
of Mass Destruction Branch of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA);
Michael Spies, a UNODA expert who supported the OEWG and the negotiating
conferences and assisted the President of the conference in drafting the Treaty text; and
Veronique Christory, weapons expert at the ICRC Delegation to the UN, who has been part
of the humanitarian impact campaign since the beginning and also attended the Treaty
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negotiations. Due to the considerable political delicacy of the issue at hand and the
professional obligations of my interviewees, the notes taken during the conversations are
incorporated into the thesis without attributing them to a specific interviewee.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
This chapter provides an overview of the existing academic literature on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the role of small states and NGOs in international
security as well as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons itself and the process
that led to its adoption.
The humanitarian argument in favor of the prohibition of a certain class of weapons
is not new and has previously been employed in the campaigns to eliminate anti-personnel
landmines and cluster munitions, respectively. Price describes how in the 1990s, a vigorous
campaign was launched by around 1,000 NGOs to draw attention to the disproportionate
civilian suffering and death caused by landmines,1 culminating in their prohibition in 1997
by way of a comprehensive ban treaty, the Ottawa Convention, 2 which will be further
discussed in Chapter Five. Meanwhile, Anderson calls the role of international civil society
into question, claiming that there is no evidence of “real democratization of international
law”3 and that the treaty was instead elaborated by newly emerging global transnational
elites. Another point made in connection with the Ottawa Convention puts the present
contemplation of the TPNW into perspective. Thakur and Maley argue that:
[T]he fundamental purpose of international humanitarian law is not the
exacting one of securing the absolute disappearance of particular forms of
1

Price, Richard (1998) “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”
International Organization Vol. 52 (3): p. 618.
2
United Nations (1997) Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Treaty Text):
http://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm.
3
Anderson, Kenneth (2000) “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International NonGovernmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society” European Journal of
International Law Vol. 11 (1): p. 91f.
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conduct, but rather the more realistic one of producing some amelioration
of the circumstances that combatants and noncombatants will confront
should war break out.4
A similar approach was adopted in relation to cluster munitions a decade later.
Docherty describes how humanitarian concerns were not only used in the campaign against
cluster munitions, but embedded in the convention itself.5 The 2008 Convention on Cluster
Munitions (CCM) contains humanitarian obligations regarding victim assistance and
makes several references to international humanitarian law, 6 as examined in detail by
Docherty, Hulme and Corsi. Hulme states that cluster munitions “can have indiscriminate
effects and risks causing an unbearable humanitarian toll.”7 She therefore considers the
CCM to be both a humanitarian instrument and an arms control treaty. Another parallel to
the TPNW can be found in Corsi’s article, which details how Norway worked closely with
interested states, UN agencies, the ICRC and other humanitarian organizations during the
campaign against cluster munitions.8
Borrie also points out the similarities in the structure of the policy discourse around
nuclear weapons, anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. While some of the people
involved in the earlier campaigns also took an active part in the anti-nuclear weapons
discourse, Borrie acknowledges that the set of states in possession of these weapons is

4

Thakur, Ramesh & Maley, William (1999) “The Ottawa Convention on Landmines: A Landmark
Humanitarian Treaty in Arms Control?” Global Governance Vol. 5 (3): p. 273.
5
Docherty, Bonnie (2009) “Breaking New Ground: The Convention on Cluster Munitions and the
Evolution of International Humanitarian Law” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 31 (4): p. 934f.
6
United Nations (2008) Convention on Cluster Munitions (Treaty Text):
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/E6D340011E720FC9C1257516005818B8/$file/C
onvention+on+Cluster+Munitions+E.pdf
7
Hulme, Karen (2009) “The 2008 Cluster Munitions Convention: Stepping outside the CCW Framework
(Again)” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 58 (1): p. 221.
8
Corsi, Jessica (2009) “Towards Peace Through Legal Innovation: The Process and the Promise of the
2008 Cluster Munitions Convention” Harvard Human Rights Journal Vol. 22 (1): p. 149.
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vastly different.9 He further believes that the frameworks in which we conceive of an issue
are socially constructed, and describes how the nuclear weapons discourse was built around
the humanitarian consequences of these weapons with a view to presenting them as
impractical and counterproductive for states claiming to uphold human rights principles.10
The discontent that many non-nuclear-armed states as well as civil society actors harbor
regarding the lack of disarmament progress within the NPT framework, contributing to the
slow erosion of the NPT regime, is described by Kmentt, 11 Thakur 12 and Acheson. 13
Williams et al. make a similar observation and elaborate on other less than successful
disarmament initiatives and frameworks, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. 14 Helfand, in his article about nuclear famine, delves
deeper into the scientific foundations of the humanitarian initiative. He describes the
catastrophic effects even a limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would
have on global climate and consequently on food security.15 Maresca and Mitchell take a
closer look at the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to nuclear weapons16
and describe the catastrophic consequences of any nuclear weapon detonation as well as

9

Borrie, John (2014) “Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban” International
Affairs Vol. 90 (3): p. 627f.
10
Ibid., p. 636f.
11
Kmentt, Alexander (2013) “How Divergent Views on Nuclear Disarmament Threaten the NPT” Arms
Control Today Vol. 43 (10): p. 9.
12
Thakur, Ramesh (2017) “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament”
Washington Quarterly Vol. 40 (4): p. 78.
13
Acheson, Ray (2010) “Beyond the 2010 NPT Review Conference: What’s next for nuclear
disarmament?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 66 (6): p. 77f.
14
Williams, Heather et al. (2015) “The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative: The ‘Big
Tent’ in Disarmament” Chatham House Royal Institute of International Affairs, Research Paper.
15
Helfand, Ira (2013) “Nuclear Famine” Peace Review Vol. 25 (4): p. 541ff.
16
Maresca, Louis & Mitchell, Eleanor (2015) “The human costs and legal consequences of nuclear
weapons under international humanitarian law” International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 97 (899): p.
622.
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the inability to respond effectively to such a disaster. 17 Contemplating these severe
consequences in the light of international humanitarian law lays the ideational foundation
for the humanitarian impact initiative. Slade et al. provide further detail on the reframing
of the nuclear weapons discourse “away from the traditional realm of State security […]
and towards the grim reality of the humanitarian impacts.”18 Kmentt was actively involved
in the humanitarian reframing of the nuclear disarmament discourse. In his article, he
describes how the humanitarian initiative was conceived as an alternative to the Cold War
security concept of nuclear deterrence based on the threat of “mutually assured
destruction.”19 He details the evolution of the humanitarian initiative, from the 2010 NPT
Review Conference and the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons to the 2015 NPT Review Conference.20 Considine offers a critical view of the
humanitarian initiative, claiming that it is in no way historical or transformational, but
rather a repetition of a call that has been made since the end of World War II. 21
The humanitarian impact initiative was, as already mentioned, driven by a coalition
of smaller, less influential states with the support of civil society. Long examines the
options and resources available to small states in international relations. He challenges the

17

Maresca, Louis & Mitchell, Eleanor (2015) “The human costs and legal consequences of nuclear
weapons under international humanitarian law” International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 97 (899): p.
624.
18
Slade, Richard et al. (2015) “Protecting humanity from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons: Reframing the debate towards the humanitarian impact” International Review of the Red
Cross Vol. 97 (899): p. 731ff.
19
Kmentt, Alexander (2015) “The development of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons and its effect on the nuclear weapons debate” International Review of the Red Cross Vol.
97 (899): p. 682.
20
Ibid. p. 889ff.
21
Considine, Laura (2017) “The ‘standardization of catastrophe’: Nuclear disarmament, the Humanitarian
Initiative and the politics of the unthinkable” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 23 (3): p.
696.
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conventional belief that small states cannot achieve results in the face of great power
opposition and separates the power available to small states into three categories: derivative
(through a relationship to a great power), collective (through coalitions or institutions) and
particular-intrinsic (through special assets). 22 Panke examines the circumstances under
which these states stand a chance to “punch above their weight.”23 Those circumstances
include an institutionalized setting for negotiations, collaboration with NGOs and
specialized agencies, as well as coalition-building.
As early as 2001, Cullen and Morrow wrote about the formation of an international
civil society24 and underscored the role of the ICRC in the implementation of international
humanitarian law. 25 Atwood describes the struggle NGOs have faced while trying to
establish themselves in multilateral disarmament fora.26 According to his observations, the
more arms control is framed as a national security issue, the harder it is for NGOs to access
negotiations.27 He subsequently proposes ways in which NGOs can facilitate progress in
multilateral forums and also raises the issue of human security and humanitarian
approaches to arms control.28 Minor emphasizes the key role that ICAN and other NGOs
played before and during the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons,
gathering key evidence on humanitarian consequences and adding legitimacy to the state-

22

Long, Tom (2017) “Small States, Great Power? Gaining Influence Through Intrinsic, Derivative, and
Collective Power” International Studies Review Vol. 19 (2): p. 185f.
23
Panke, Diana (2012) “Small states in multilateral negotiations: What have we learned?” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs Vol. 25 (3): p. 387.
24
Cullen, Holly & Morrow, Karen (2001) “International civil society in international law: The growth of
NGO participation” Non-State Actors and International Law Vo. 1 (1): p. 7.
25
Ibid., p. 15f.
26
Atwood, David (2006) “NGOs and Multilateral Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits and Possibilities” in:
Borrie, John & Martin Randin, Vanessa (Eds.) Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and
Arms Control Negotiations. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR: p. 36.
27
Ibid., p. 38.
28
Ibid., p. 41ff.
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led initiative by building momentum in global civil society. 29 Borrie et al. examine the
interplay of different actors according to the transnational advocacy networks (TAN)
theory.30 This theory, which focuses on civil society actors lobbying states, does not tell
the full story regarding the humanitarian initiative, however. Borrie et al. point out the
importance of networks of trust between activists, diplomats and other officials, and
highlight the contributions of actors out of the public eye, such as researchers and
employees of international organizations.31
The conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, the process
leading up to them, and the activities of the OEWG are described in detail by Potter32 and
Kmentt.33 Their writings on the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conferences, the respective
Preparatory Committee meetings, the conferences in Oslo, Nayarit and Vienna, and the
meetings of the OEWG in Geneva will be discussed more comprehensively in Chapter
Four of this thesis. Thakur describes the TPNW negotiations in New York in March, June
and July 2017 as well as the related draft resolutions introduced in the First Committee of
the UN General Assembly.34 From his vantage point as a participant in all stages of the
process, Potter provides detailed information on the negotiations and the positions of key

29

Minor, Elizabeth (2015) “Changing the discourse on nuclear weapons: The humanitarian initiative”
International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 97 (899): p. 714.
30
Borrie, John et al. (2018) “Obstacles to understanding the emergence and significance of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 30 (2): p. 3.
31
Ibid., p. 22.
32
Potter, William C. (2017) “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty” Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy Vol. 59 (4): p. 76ff.
33
Kmentt, Alexander (2015) “The development of the international initiative on the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons and its effect on the nuclear weapons debate” International Review of the Red Cross
Vol. 97 (899): p. 689ff.
34
Thakur, Ramesh (2017) “Japan and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: the wrong side of history,
geography, legality, morality and humanity” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament: p. 8f.
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member states.35 Dunworth gives an overview of the key provisions of the Treaty text,
taking particular note of the victim assistance provisions and the obligation of states parties
to remedy environmental damage caused by nuclear weapons detonations. 36 Jenkins
highlights the final paragraphs of the Treaty’s preamble, which recognize the important
roles of women, NGOs and education in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 37
Borrie et al. also offer a first-hand account of the negotiation process, with a particular
focus on the modalities of the negotiations and assessments of the influence of state and
civil society actors on the Treaty text.38
A number of articles have been published in reaction to the Treaty’s adoption,
commenting on the merits of the Treaty itself and on the stances of particular member
states. Kibaroglu and Sauer, writing from a Turkish perspective, take the adoption of the
TPNW as an occasion to advocate for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe,
calling them “obsolete.”39 Thakur sharply criticizes the Japanese government’s opposition
to the TPNW and points out several flaws in the reasoning behind nuclear deterrence.40
Based on an observation of the voting behavior of NATO member states on UN General
Assembly resolutions related to the TPNW, Sauer divides non-nuclear-armed NATO states

35

Potter, William C. (2017) “Disarmament Diplomacy and the Nuclear Ban Treaty” Survival: Global
Politics and Strategy Vol. 59 (4): p. 91ff.
36
Dunworth, Treasa (2017) “The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” ASIL Insights, published
online on October 31, 2017: https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/12/treaty-prohibition-nuclearweapons.
37
Jenkins, Bonnie (2017) “How a U.N. treaty on nuclear weapons makes international security policy more
inclusive” Brookings Institute: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/12/how-a-u-ntreaty-on-nuclear-weapons-makes-international-security-policy-more-inclusive/.
38
Borrie, John et al. (2018) “Obstacles to understanding the emergence and significance of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 30 (2): p. 14ff.
39
Kibaroglu, Mustafa & Sauer, Tom (2017) “Mr. Trump, Post Nuclear Ban Treaty, NATO’s Nuclear
Weapons in Europe are Obsolete” Insight Turkey Vol. 19 (3): p. 23.
40
Thakur, Ramesh (2017) “Japan and the Nuclear Weapons Prohibition Treaty: the wrong side of history,
geography, legality, morality and humanity” Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament: p. 2f.
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into three main groups. Those who have shown little to no support for the process include
the Baltic states, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Turkey, Romania, and, to a lesser
degree, Italy and Spain. Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Canada, Germany
and Slovakia have demonstrated more moderate voting patterns. The third group is made
up of countries who regularly abstained on votes related to the humanitarian consequences
of nuclear weapons and includes the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, and even
more so Denmark, Iceland and Norway.41 Rühle endeavors to justify NATO opposition to
the Treaty by pointing out that the delegitimization of nuclear weapons as pursued by the
Treaty’s proponents can only work in countries with a vibrant civil society. He claims that
the delegitimization will therefore put democratic countries at a disadvantage compared to
China, Russia and other illiberal nuclear-armed states, negatively impacting Western
nuclear deterrence capabilities. If this makes major war more likely, he concludes,
delegitimizing nuclear weapons can actually be considered immoral. He believes that
disarmament can only be realized after the political conflicts that lead to nuclear weapons
possession have been resolved.42 This reaction stands in sharp contrast to Kurosawa’s, who
maintains that the stigmatization of nuclear weapons will increase as more states join the
Treaty as well as over time, until their possession and use eventually become incompatible
“with the identity that [a] state wishes to have in the world.”43 Egeland goes one step further
by affirming that the Treaty is highly significant even beyond the realm of disarmament,

41

Sauer, Tom (2017) “How will NATO’s non-nuclear members handle the UN’s ban on nuclear weapons?”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 73 (3): p. 177f.
42
Rühle, Michael (2017) “The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: reasons for skepticism” NATO Review, May
19, 2017: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/nuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-scepticismabolition/en/index.htm.
43
Ibid., p. 14.
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as its adoption indicates that “most of the world’s states are no longer prepared to accord
certain states special entitlements under international law.”44
Concerning the implementation of the Treaty and the advancement of nuclear
disarmament in general, Rydell points to the need of a strategic plan and proposes
10 initiatives in this regard, including the refusal to invest in companies associated with
nuclear weapons, the sensitization of the business community more generally, the
mobilization of foundations and private donors, and outreach to professional associations.45
Kurosawa elaborates on the difference between delegitimization and stigmatization and
calls for both approaches to be pursued simultaneously in an effort to promote Treaty
implementation. 46 Thakur argues that due to its normative nature, the Treaty will
eventually create a compliance pull, and that it has the potential of closing several legal
gaps, including in relation to the threat of use of nuclear weapons and the nuclear-armed
states outside the NPT.47 Nonetheless, he also sees several challenges ahead, including
competition with the NPT and an enforcement dilemma, since the five permanent members
of the UN Security Council oppose the TPNW.48
The subsequent chapters of this thesis will add to the existing academic literature
by making a more inclusive argument for the uniqueness and significance of the TPNW,
based on an analysis of a large number of primary and secondary written sources as well

44

Egeland, Kjølv (2018) “Banning the Bomb: Inconsequential Posturing or Meaningful Stigmatization?”
Global Governance Vol. 24 (1): p. 11.
45
Rydell, Randy (2017) “A strategic plan for nuclear disarmament: Engineering a perfect political storm”
Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament: p. 14.
46
Kurosawa, Mitsuru (2018) “Stigmatizing and delegitimizing nuclear weapons” Journal for Peace and
Nuclear Disarmament: p. 1f.
47
Thakur, Ramesh (2017) “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament”
Washington Quarterly Vol. 40 (4): p. 81f.
48
Ibid., p. 88f.
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as on the interviews I conducted. While the beginnings of the humanitarian initiative have
already been documented to some extent, the first-hand accounts add new insights into the
cooperation between states and NGOs and into the causalities and deliberations that drove
the initiative in the direction of a treaty. Moreover, this thesis is one of the first academic
works to document the later stages of the process, notably the Treaty negotiations
themselves, and to discuss the way forward as envisioned by the Treaty’s architects. The
sources I examined are by no means exhaustive and this thesis gives only a sectional view
of the process surrounding the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW. As Borrie et al.
rightly affirm, extensive further research is required in order to paint a complete picture,
since many important developments originated in closed and informal meetings and are
therefore not reflected in official records.49 To develop a full understanding of the roles of
the various actors and of the dynamics of the process, the oral accounts and personal notes
of those involved will have to be comprehensively chronicled and examined. The present
thesis, with its analysis of the currently available sources as well as the interviews
conducted, is a first step in this direction.

49

Borrie, John et al. (2018) “Obstacles to understanding the emergence and significance of the Treaty on
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” Global Change, Peace & Security Vol. 30 (2): p. 19.
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Chapter 3
The status quo of nuclear disarmament regimes in 2010
This chapter gives an overview of the situation of multilateral nuclear disarmament
frameworks at the time the humanitarian impact initiative emerged. An examination of the
situation at this point in time will allow for a more in-depth understanding of the
motivations and interests behind the initiative.
The first step towards understanding these motivations is to look at the sheer
numbers of nuclear arms still in existence a quarter-century after the end of the Cold War.
Nine states are presently in possession of nuclear weapons (the US, the Russian Federation,
China, France, the UK, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea), and each of them is
making significant investments into the modernization of their nuclear arsenals. 50 The
number of nuclear warheads has been reduced significantly since its peak in 1986, but from
a technological perspective, they could be dismantled much faster.51 There are still around
14,200 nuclear warheads in existence worldwide, of which approximately 9,300 are
stockpiled for potential use and 3,600 are deployed (on or nearby operational delivery
systems).52 Past efforts towards nuclear stockpile reduction, mainly in the form of bilateral
agreements between the US and Russia, never extended to tactical nuclear weapons.
Therefore, the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads mentioned above do not accurately
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reflect the total number of nuclear weapons in existence.53 The US also deploys its nuclear
weapons on foreign soil, with “approximately 200 nuclear bombs at six air bases in five
NATO countries – Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey,”54 and extends
its nuclear weapons as protection to other allies such as Australia, Japan and South Korea.
These extended security guarantees, also known as the “nuclear umbrella,”55 significantly
increase the actual area of proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the possessor states
themselves. The concrete danger posed by the presence of these stockpiles across Europe,
North America and Asia will be discussed in the following chapter.
Since the end of World War II, there have been numerous attempts to tackle the
proliferation of nuclear weapons at the regional and international level, both bilaterally and
multilaterally. Existing nuclear disarmament and control frameworks include the NPT, the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not entered into force, 56 the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and other bilateral agreements between the US, the
Russian Federation and other former Soviet states,57 as well as regional nuclear-weaponfree zones (NWFZ). One hundred states and over 50 per cent of the globe are covered by
NWFZ, including all of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Central Asia and the
South Pacific.58 The fact that NWFZ encompass the entire southern hemisphere makes the
strong support of the Global South for the humanitarian initiative easier to understand.
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The NPT has been the main instrument of the international nuclear regime since its
entry into force in 1970. Under the NPT, a clear distinction is made between non-nuclearweapon states (NNWS) and nuclear-weapon states (NWS). The former pledge to renounce
nuclear weapons and subject their civilian nuclear programs to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections to verify compliance. The five recognized NWS,
coinciding with the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), are allowed to
maintain their arsenals and are not subject to inspections.59 Initially, the NWS, notably the
US and the USSR, had no intention of halting their ongoing nuclear arms race. Only as a
result of substantial pressure from non-aligned states did they finally agree to Article VI of
the NPT, 60 in which NWS pledge to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and
effective international control.”61 Article VI does not specify concrete steps or timelines
for disarmament. Nuclear-armed states are simply required to demonstrate that they are
pursuing disarmament negotiations “in good faith.” Even at the time, NNWS were aware
of the vagueness of this commitment, and their doubts were proven correct over subsequent
decades. Despite the NPT’s impressive record concerning non-proliferation,62 not a single
nuclear warhead has ever been eliminated under the NPT regime. 63 (Any nuclear
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disarmament at the end of the Cold War was the result of bilateral efforts between Russia
and the US.)
In return for the international community’s consent to the indefinite extension of
the NPT in 1995, three additional disarmament provisions were included in the relevant
decision of the Conference of the Parties, entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament.” 64 Firstly, the conclusion of a Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty; secondly, the
review of the implementation of the states parties’ commitments by the Preparatory
Committee; and thirdly, efforts to create a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the
Middle East.65 Similar assurances were given at the 2000 Review Conference in the form
of 13 “practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI” as
well as the 1995 principles and objectives.66 Whereas the 2005 NPT Review Conference
failed to produce any results, the 2010 NPT Review Conference took place in a generally
positive international climate. President Obama’s 2009 Prague Agenda speech calling for
a world free of nuclear weapons, along with the conclusion of the New START Treaty
between the US and Russia, had reinvigorated the disarmament community. 67 The Arab
Spring and the annexation of Crimea had not yet soured relations between East and West,
and after the failure of the 2005 conference, the international community had high hopes
for reaching a substantial agreement on disarmament this time around. Indeed, the 2010
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conference was widely hailed as a success since it produced a concrete Action Plan
designed to make disarmament efforts more measurable and thus increasing
accountability. 68 Acheson, however, argues that the final document hid the continued
resistance of the nuclear-armed states parties to any concrete disarmament commitments.69
For instance, France, Russia and the US would not commit to cease the development of
advanced new types of nuclear weapons.70
The failure of the NWS to uphold their end of the bargain led to growing frustration
among the NNWS and made them reluctant to agree to any concrete non-proliferation
measures. This dynamic virtually halted progress in both areas and was beginning to
undermine the decades-old NPT regime. A debate emerged around the double standards
set by the treaty, which allowed the nuclear-armed states to control the NPT regime and
use it to maintain their strategic military advantage over other states. 71 Another factor
contributing to the gradual erosion of the NPT regime is the fact that three NWS—India,
Israel and Pakistan—are not parties to the treaty and therefore not bound by its provisions.72
North Korea could arguably be added to that list, rendering the NPT ineffective in
combating the most immediate current nuclear threat.
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The Conference on Disarmament, a UN body that brings together 60 member states
at yearly meetings in Geneva, has been paralyzed ever since the conclusion of the
negotiations for the CTBT in 1996.73 Since all its decisions must be taken by consensus,
the Conference has not even succeeded in adopting a program of work in several years.
Much the same can be said for the New York-based UN Disarmament Commission. In
those two forums as well as the NPT conferences, the NWS effectively control the
institutional procedures and have the power to impede any disarmament initiatives that do
not suit their military interests.74 For Acheson, this standstill of the nuclear disarmament
process is partly owed to the fact that the negotiations in these forums are conducted by
elites and that civil society has been excluded from the process almost entirely, denying
ordinary citizens who would suffer the most severe consequences of a nuclear war a voice
in the matter.75 The unfavorable circumstances and entrenched positions within existing
nuclear disarmament and control frameworks were undoubtedly an important impetus for
civil society, states of the Global South and other like-minded states to embrace the
conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, which were significantly
more inclusive, dynamic and open-minded.76
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Chapter 4
The evolution of the humanitarian initiative and the related multilateral process
Although nuclear disarmament efforts are almost as old as the weapons themselves,
the new approach to nuclear disarmament known as the humanitarian impact initiative only
surfaced over the last decade. In this chapter, I will draw a timeline of the humanitarian
initiative from its beginnings all the way to the achievement of a mandate to negotiate a
nuclear weapon ban treaty, with the aim of building a comprehensive understanding of the
process before the ideological background, the strategies and the actors involved in the
humanitarian initiative are discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
The idea for the humanitarian initiative can be traced back to a speech by Jakob
Kellenberger, former president of the ICRC, on April 20, 2010. Addressing the diplomatic
corps in Geneva, he recited the testimony of an ICRC delegate who was the first foreign
doctor present in the immediate aftermath of the 1945 bombing in Hiroshima. Kellenberger
pointed out that even today, the international community does not have the capacities to
adequately address a humanitarian emergency of such magnitude. He went on to state that
the ICRC found it difficult to envision a scenario where the use of nuclear weapons might
be compatible with international humanitarian law.77 Coming from the organization that
considers itself the guardian of international humanitarian law, this statement became an
important input for the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 and was taken up by the
Austrian and Swiss delegations at the meetings.78 Thus, the humanitarian dimension of
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nuclear war was addressed in an NPT consensus document for the first time, with a passage
in the 2010 Action Plan that read:
The Conference expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all
States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including
international humanitarian law.79
In combination with Action I of the Action Plan, in which states committed to
policies compatible with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, the
above statement can be interpreted as a mandate for states to pursue the humanitarian
initiative in their implementation of the NPT. This interpretation became an important
argument to counter one of the main critiques that the NWS aimed at the humanitarian
initiative, namely that it distracted from the implementation of the NPT.80
In the timeline of the humanitarian initiative, the next step within the NPT
framework was the first Preparatory Committee meeting (in 2012) for the 2015 Review
Conference in Vienna. During this meeting, Switzerland presented the first cross-regional
statement on the humanitarian initiative on behalf of 16 states, who became known as the
“Group of 16,” 81 and Norway announced that it would host a conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in 2013. In the same year, the first OEWG was
established through a General Assembly resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral
disarmament negotiations,”82 sponsored by Austria, Mexico and Norway, among others.
The OEWG met in Geneva for 15 working days. Although it produced no ground-breaking
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final report, the OEWG ushered in a new kind of meeting that was previously unheard of
in nuclear arms control: a meeting not dominated by the P5, where civil society was invited
to actively participate, and where speakers brought forward constructive ideas instead of
lamenting the status quo and the inaction of other parties.83 These OEWG meetings can
therefore be considered the first official meetings that carried the spirit of the humanitarian
initiative.
By 2012, the NWS, who had likely attributed little importance to the mention of
the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons when they first subscribed to the 2010
Action Plan, began to realize that the humanitarian initiative was gaining traction.
According to Kmentt, this development took them by surprise. 84 Although the US
considered disarmament a bilateral affair, the Obama administration was, at least in the
beginning, open to dialogue with the humanitarian initiative. Without decisive US
leadership, other NATO members and allies were unable to slow the momentum of the
humanitarian initiative effectively.85
The conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria
The first of the three conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons
took place in Oslo in March 2013. It consisted mainly of expert presentations on the
humanitarian and socioeconomic consequences of any detonation of nuclear weapons and
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on preparedness and response to nuclear emergencies. The Norwegian hosts kept the focus
on facts and evidence, purposefully avoiding a more political discussion or the premature
adoption of conclusions. Before the conference, ICAN hosted a civil society forum that
brought together hundreds of activists and contributed to the dynamic atmosphere of the
subsequent conference.86 Among the participants of the conference itself were delegations
from 127 countries, several UN organizations such as UNHCR, OCHA, UNDP and WFP,
as well as a variety of civil society representatives. The ICRC and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) both sent large delegations,
and ICAN was represented with numerous partner organizations from different countries.87
The NWS collectively boycotted the conference in a rare demonstration of P5 solidarity.
According to Kmentt, their assumption was that without their participation, any discussion
about nuclear weapons would be an exercise in futility. To the supporters of the
humanitarian initiative, this dismissive attitude only served as further proof that the NWS
had no interest in changing the status quo and no serious intentions to pursue complete
nuclear disarmament as envisioned in the NPT.88 Perhaps on account of Norway being a
member of NATO, or on account of the humanitarian initiative being in its early stages,
the Chair’s summary issued by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry was succinct and limited
to facts about nuclear weapons, while avoiding any political statements. Its three main
points were that the international community cannot adequately address the humanitarian
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emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation; that the immediate and long-term
effects of such a detonation are well-known; and that these effects will transcend national
borders. 89 At the closing meeting, Mexico announced its intention to host a follow-up
conference,90 thus guaranteeing the continuity of the humanitarian initiative.
The second conference took place in Nayarit, Mexico in February 2014 and brought
together 146 states. One of its most salient features was the testimony of the hibakusha,
the survivors of the atomic bomb detonations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their stories
helped to shift the focus of the disarmament discourse away from technicalities and towards
the lives of real human beings. Moreover, the Nayarit conference addressed the element of
risk associated with the existence of nuclear arsenals and the deployment of nuclear
weapons. It exposed the vulnerabilities of the nuclear command and control infrastructure
by citing 16 historical cases of so-called near misses – nuclear accidents that almost
happened due to human or technical error. Naturally, the security of nuclear arsenals is not
only threatened by accidents, but also by cyber-attacks and terrorist activities. The Nayarit
conference had a more political dimension than the one in Oslo and featured a general
debate with contributions by almost 80 state delegations.91 This time, the Chair’s summary
did not avoid politically charged statements. It declared the mere existence of nuclear
weapons to be absurd on account of the cost, both material and human, associated with
them, and openly called for a legally binding instrument to outlaw nuclear weapons.92 This
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direct language gave rise to significant controversy. Several participating states, including
Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey, did not feel that the summary
adequately reflected their views and criticized it as going too far.93
This controversy significantly complicated the work of the organizers of the next
conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, to be held in Vienna in
December of the same year. They were faced not only with the delicate task of appeasing
European NATO states in order to assure their participation, but also with the ambitious
expectations of NGOs and other proponents of the legal instrument that Mexico had put on
the agenda. In the lead-up to the conference, NWS as well as nuclear umbrella states
launched numerous diplomatic appeals to the Austrian hosts, seeking reassurance that the
conference would not produce a political outcome contrary to their interests. This was a
clear sign that the NWS and their allies were growing increasingly concerned that the
humanitarian impact conferences would indeed turn into a slippery slope towards a treaty
banning nuclear weapons.94
In an effort to reconcile these expectations, Austrian diplomats immediately began
outreach efforts and sought to avert confrontation by reaffirming that the humanitarian
initiative was in line with the objectives of the NPT and that the views of all participants
would be reflected in the Chair’s summary. Most importantly, they reached out to US State
Department officials, who seemed to be looking for a way to insert themselves into the
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humanitarian initiative. Having encountered substantial difficulties in the realization of
President Obama’s Prague Agenda, they sought to retain their credibility on nuclear
disarmament and preferred to leave the obstructionist role to France and Russia. This gave
rise to a solid working relationship with the State Department and with several US-based
think tanks. Since the Ukraine crisis had driven a wedge between Russia and the remaining
P5 members, the conference organizers saw an opportunity to soften the nuclear-weapon
states’ united front of categorical opposition. In the end, the US did indeed join the
conference and the UK quickly followed suit, generating a significant surge in international
news coverage and heightened interest among US think tanks such as the Arms Control
Association. 95 Although the number of participating states increased to 158, 96 France,
Russia and China continued to boycott the humanitarian initiative entirely.97
Among the salient elements of the Vienna conference were the health,
environmental and social impacts of nuclear weapons testing, illustrated with testimonies
by victims from Utah, Australia and the Marshall Islands, as well as the gender dimension
of radiation exposure, which affects women more severely than men. Moral aspects and
the legality of nuclear weapons under international law were also discussed. The last day
of the conference featured a general debate, 98 during which an increasing number of
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delegations were explicitly calling for a prohibition of nuclear weapons. In the Chair’s
Summary, the hosts fulfilled their promise that the views of both sides would be reflected.99
Since the Austrian delegation did not consider the resulting document assertive enough,
they simultaneously issued their own national statement, the Austrian Pledge. 100 The
Austrian government pledged, among other things, to take the findings of the humanitarian
conferences to the next NPT Review Conference and to cooperate with all relevant
stakeholders “in efforts to stigmatize, prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons.” 101 The
document called for the legal gap regarding nuclear weapons to be filled, but did not yet
specifically mention a ban treaty. After the conference, Austria invited other states to
endorse the pledge and ICAN actively promoted it at the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
The pledge gained significant momentum and by the end of the conference, 114 states had
subscribed to it.102 In the light of widespread and growing support, it was renamed the
Humanitarian Pledge.
The 2015 NPT Review Conference
The 2015 NPT Review Conference is mostly remembered for its failure to produce
a consensus final document, due to the breakdown of negotiations in a closed group
addressing the Middle East. Nonetheless, the conference resulted in some noteworthy
developments. Building on the above-mentioned Humanitarian Pledge, Austria issued a
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statement on the humanitarian initiative on behalf of 159 states. Australia presented
another, less ambitious statement on the same issue on behalf of 26 states. The New
Agenda Coalition (NAC), consisting of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and
South Africa, 103 submitted a working paper expressing support of the humanitarian
initiative and “[rejecting] attempts to assert a right to indefinite possession of nuclear
weapons by the nuclear-weapon states or to justify the continued retention of nuclear
weapons on security grounds.”

104

In an attempt to reach consensus on nuclear

disarmament, the President of the conference convened a Focus Group of 19 states,
consisting of the P5, the 6 members of the NAC as well as Austria, Australia, Cuba,
Indonesia, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands and Sweden. It was in this group that the idea of
creating a new OEWG was first brought forward.105 It is interesting to note that in Kmentt’s
opinion, the humanitarian initiative gained traction not despite but because of the abovementioned lack of consensus at the NPT Review Conference.106
The 2016 OEWG
When it came to creating another OEWG, there was a fundamental disagreement
on whether it was necessary and/or desirable for NWS to participate and whether decisions
within the OEWG should be made by consensus.107 The struggle to obtain a mandate for
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an OEWG based on General Assembly (GA) rules of procedure (which do not require
consensus) has been described as the most difficult phase of the entire multilateral
process.108 The proponents of this type of OEWG had the advantage of building on the
existing resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations”, which
already had a solid base of supporters in the GA. Austria and Mexico, among other
sponsors, introduced this amended resolution in the First Committee of the GA, arguing
that under GA rules of procedure, the OEWG could not be held hostage by individual
states. Meanwhile, Iran drafted a competing resolution for a consensus-based OEWG. The
First Committee discussions of these two draft resolutions were described to me as a wild
battle that created absurd situations, like the P5 (including the US) lauding Iran for its
resolution while disparaging Austria and Mexico. 109 Under consensus-based rules, the
NWS and their allies would have been able to effectively prevent any progress that went
against their interests. In the end, Iran (the Chair of the Non-Aligned Movement, NAM)
withdrew its draft resolution because it could not harness the full support of the NAM or
the US. Consequently, the Austrian/Mexican draft was adopted and an OEWG based on
GA rules of procedure was created. Potter’s impression as a participant in the OEWG
sessions was that the most ardent supporters of the humanitarian initiative actually
preferred to move forward without the NWS. 110 This observation is in line with the
assertions of several of my interviewees, who agreed that the negotiations became
noticeably smoother from the 2016 OEWG onwards due to a basic consensus among the
participants about the way forward. Along the same lines, Berry et al. argue that
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negotiations with fewer players who share a higher common interest produce more
concrete agreements – a departure from traditional arms control frameworks, where the
lowest common denominator is the order of the day because decisions must be made
unanimously.111
The primary mandate of the OEWG, established pursuant to GA resolution 70/33,
was to “address concrete effective legal measures, legal provisions and norms that will
need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.”112 During
the OEWG meetings, representatives from Latin America and the Caribbean were
particularly active, and civil society organizations participated in all meetings except the
last. Several NATO states along with Australia, South Korea and Japan formed their own
group of so-called “progressive states,” promoting a pragmatic step-by-step approach to
nuclear disarmament. The majority of the 103 participating states, however, supported the
launch of negotiations on a legally binding instrument for the prohibition of nuclear
weapons, which was reflected in the OEWG report. 113 Due to opposition by the
“progressive states,” the report was not adopted by consensus, but rather by a vote, 114
which can usually be interpreted as a sign of considerable controversy, given that the text
of such a report is negotiated and already contains compromise language.
During the OEWG meetings, different options were put forward for the concrete
nature of the proposed legal instrument and included a nuclear weapons convention and a
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nuclear weapons prohibition treaty. The idea of a nuclear weapons convention has existed
at least since 1997, when a group of lawyers, scientists, disarmament experts and activists
elaborated a model nuclear weapons convention, containing provisions to:
… outlaw the use, possession, development, testing, deployment, and
transfer of nuclear weapons, as well as mandate internationally verifiable
dismantlement of nuclear arsenals.115
The model convention was updated in 2007, following the examples of the
conventions against chemical and biological weapons as well as anti-personnel landmines.
Costa Rica and Malaysia submitted the updated model convention as a working paper to
the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna. 116 Similar to the Chemical
Weapons Convention or the Ottawa Convention, a nuclear weapons convention would
regulate the technical aspects of the elimination of nuclear weapons in detail and contain
concrete provisions for compliance verification. A prohibition treaty would outlaw the use
and threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as other related activities such as nuclear
testing and the development, acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons, but refrain
from going into technical detail. Therefore, a ban treaty and a convention are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, a ban could be a first step on the way to a more
comprehensive legal instrument dealing with the actual elimination and verification
processes. 117 The report of the OEWG also reflected this view and recommended
negotiating, in 2017, a legally binding instrument containing “general prohibitions and
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obligations as well as a political commitment to achieve and maintain a nuclear-weaponfree world.” 118 A simple ban treaty was considered the most viable option for the
immediate future because it could be achieved relatively quickly and would not require the
support of all states. Since a significant number of states nonetheless supported the idea of
a nuclear weapons convention, the report recommended that this idea be reconsidered at a
high-level conference in 2018.119
Upon recommendation of the OEWG, provisions to convene a negotiating
conference for a nuclear weapons prohibition treaty were included in the 2016 draft of the
resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.”120 The
resolution was adopted with 123 votes in favor, 38 against and 16 abstentions. 121 The
mandated negotiations were to take place in New York from 27 to 31 March and from 15
June to 7 July, 2017 under the rules of procedure of the GA. The negotiating mandate
explicitly encouraged the participation and contribution of international organizations and
civil society representatives.
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Chapter 5
Reframing the nuclear disarmament discourse
After the previous chapter’s overview of the events and developments that marked
the humanitarian initiative, this chapter takes a closer look at the ideological background,
the arguments and the discourse strategies its proponents employed and continue to
employ.
International humanitarian law
The humanitarian approach to disarmament considers weapons from an apolitical
perspective, focusing not on their real or perceived military utility, but on their effects on
human beings. The legitimacy of a weapon is determined according to whether or not it
causes unacceptable harm.122 Following this line of argument, the humanitarian approach
assumes:
… that any use of nuclear weapons is likely to be in breach of international
humanitarian law, that on this basis states should logically agree that the use
of these weapons is illegal, and that this approach can and should lead to
international agreements banning, and then possibly abolishing, nuclear
weapons.123
This assumption is based on the principles of humanitarian law that govern warfare,
including the principle of discrimination, the principle of proportionality, the principle of
not damaging the environment and the principle of avoiding unnecessary suffering. 124
Discrimination refers to the obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians as
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well as military and civilian targets.125 The principle of proportionality prohibits an attack
that causes loss of life and property disproportionate to the anticipated military
advantage.126 The relationship between nuclear weapons and international humanitarian
law was addressed in the Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons rendered by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1996 at the request of the
UN Secretary-General. Although the ICJ “could not conclude definitively whether the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense,”127 it did find that such an act would generally be contrary to international
humanitarian law.
Addressing both the principle of not damaging the environment and the principle
of avoiding unnecessary suffering, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War released a climate impact study in 2012. This study paints a dramatic picture,
describing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of a concrete scenario of
limited, regional nuclear war, namely between India and Pakistan. Together, the two
countries account for around one per cent of the world’s nuclear arsenals. If each of them
used only half of their nuclear weapons, or around 50 Hiroshima-sized bombs, against the
other, 20 million people would die within a week from the blasts, the resulting fires and
the acute radiation exposure. The effects would not end there, however. The black soot
from the fires would rise into the Earth’s atmosphere and block sunlight, causing global
temperatures to drop by 1.3 degrees centigrade for about a decade. This dramatic disruption
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of the global climate would shorten the crop growing season and lessen rainfalls, leading
to a 12 to 30 per cent decline in agricultural production. The subsequent food shortages
and price increases would first claim the lives of 870 million already malnourished people,
but a further 300 million people living in countries that rely heavily on food imports would
also be severely affected. 128 This study clearly demonstrates that the consequences of a
nuclear weapons detonation go far beyond the borders of individual countries and cannot
be contained in space or time.129
In its 1996 advisory opinion, the ICJ also referenced environmental damage and
went even further by stating that nuclear weapons “have the potential to destroy all
civilization and the entire ecosystem of the planet” and that ionizing radiation is a “serious
danger to future generations.”130 While the most powerful conventional weapons have a
yield of 14 tons of TNT, today’s strategic nuclear weapons have a yield of several kilotons
and up to 5 megatons of TNT.131 These scientific facts demonstrate that the use of nuclear
weapons violates each of the principles of international humanitarian law cited above.
Firstly, the sheer destructive capacity of a nuclear weapon makes it practically impossible
to avoid extensive civilian harm and unnecessary suffering; secondly, the far-reaching and
long-term consequences for the environment and the socio-economic development of the
entire planet far outweigh any real or perceived military advantage of nuclear weapons use.
These observations and the recent scientific evidence suggest a conclusion even exceeding

Helfand, Ira (2013) “Nuclear Famine” Peace Review Vol. 25 (4): pp. 541ff.
Slade, Richard et al. (2015) “Protecting humanity from the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of
nuclear weapons: Reframing the debate towards the humanitarian impact” International Review of the Red
Cross Vol. 97 (899): p. 752.
130
International Court of Justice (1996) “Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons” Summary of
the Advisory opinion of 8 July 1996: http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/95/7497.pdf.
131
Sauer, Tom & Pretorius, Joelien (2014) “Nuclear weapons and the humanitarian approach” Global
Change, Peace & Security Vol. 26 (3): p. 234f.
128
129

41

that of the ICJ two decades ago, namely that nuclear weapons use is contrary to
international humanitarian law under any circumstances.
Countering nuclear deterrence theory
For proponents of the humanitarian initiative, the above-mentioned dramatic
consequences of a nuclear weapons detonation illustrate the deep flaws of nuclear
deterrence theory. A relic from the Cold War, the theory is based on the assumption that
any nuclear attack would cause such devastation that an adversary with second-strike
capability would certainly strike back, leading to “mutually assured destruction.”132 Since
this is not a desirable outcome for either side, the theory concludes, the fact that some states
possess nuclear weapons introduces higher levels of caution into international relations and
makes conflict less likely.133 Even after the adoption of the TPNW, France, the US and the
UK have stated clearly that nuclear deterrence remains the cornerstone of their security
policy. 134 The humanitarian initiative challenges this security concept based on mass
destruction with the following arguments: For deterrence to work, NWS must be credibly
committed to a suicidal course of action. This stands in direct contradiction to the claim
that deterrence and the balance of power cause states to behave more rationally. A rational
actor would be aware that a nuclear war cannot be won.135 Not only is deterrence theory
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based on a circular argument, its credibility is further weakened by the nuclear taboo – the
norm of non-use of nuclear weapons that has been observed by all states since 1945.
Coupled with the growing respect for the laws of warfare in general, this norm turns nuclear
deterrence into an increasingly hollow policy.136
The frequent claim by the US, the UK and France that an adverse international
security environment requires them to retain their nuclear weapons is equally inconsistent
– if an adverse security environment justified the possession of nuclear weapons, then
surely a beleaguered state like North Korea would also be entitled to them. 137 This
observation goes hand in hand with another argument employed by NNWS: that nuclear
deterrence only serves to reinforce the myth of nuclear weapons as instruments of power
and makes them more desirable to other states, heightening the risk of proliferation.138
Therefore, the humanitarian initiative needs to address the prestige and authority associated
with nuclear weapons, examining the commonly held beliefs about nuclear weapons in
order to deconstruct them, if possible. One such belief is that the use of atomic bombs in
Hiroshima and Nagasaki effectively ended World War II in the Pacific and therefore saved
the US a costly ground operation on Japanese soil. Recent historical research shows,
however, that it was not the atomic bombs, but rather the declaration of war by the USSR
on August 8, 1945 that drove the Japanese General Staff to capitulation. 139 The final
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argument employed to counter deterrence theory is the increased likelihood of human or
technical errors if nuclear weapons are kept in a constant state of readiness for deterrence
purposes.140 Advocates of the humanitarian initiative used these arguments to demonstrate
that the existence of nuclear weapons makes the world not more, but less secure, and to
shift the debate from the legality of nuclear weapons towards their legitimacy.
The landmines and cluster munition campaigns as models
This section examines how the humanitarian argument came to be used by
advocates of nuclear disarmament. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the frustration of many
NNWS and civil society groups with the nuclear regime centered around the NPT and the
CD strongly motivated them to seek new paths towards nuclear disarmament. To
understand why the humanitarian initiative became their chosen path, we must look
towards the campaigns for the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, typically
referred to as the Ottawa Convention, and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions
(CCM).
In 2010, the Norwegian foreign minister explicitly stated in a speech before the
Norwegian Atlantic Committee that the experience gained in humanitarian disarmament
initiatives on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions could be applied to nuclear
weapons.141 This statement by a representative of the state that would organize the first
humanitarian impact conference three years later, demonstrates that the similarities
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between the campaigns are by no means a coincidence, but a deliberate strategy. Each
campaign applied the same basic approach: changing the way we think about an issue and
reframing it to overcome an unproductive policy environment. In each case, the new
discursive framework was centered around international humanitarian law.142 Moreover,
ICAN’s organizational structure is a replica of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL), established in 1992. Like ICAN (which will be discussed in detail in
the following chapter), ICBL was led by a steering committee of six organizations and
worked with hundreds of partner organizations in different countries.143
The lines of argument used in these campaigns are also worth comparing. In the
1990s, anti-personnel landmines had become a widespread hazard and were causing large
numbers of civilian and combatant casualties in various countries worldwide. It was
therefore easy for the proponents of the Ottawa Convention to argue that these weapons
violate international humanitarian law because they cause unnecessary suffering. The
threat of cluster munitions, however, never became as pervasive. Therefore, the advocates
of the CCM had to adapt their argument to focus on precaution and prevention. 144 This
successful refocusing of the humanitarian argument is highly significant for the initiative
to ban nuclear weapons, since the record of nuclear detonations is also very limited.
Nuclear ban advocates therefore had to focus their argument on the prevention of future
suffering as well.
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Another parallel between present and past humanitarian initiatives is that many
states in possession of landmines and cluster munitions did not initially participate in the
respective processes – a previously unthinkable approach in the realm of arms control.145
Despite initial difficulties in creating a process outside traditional diplomatic channels,
there was a shared belief among the proponents of the Ottawa Convention that pursuing an
alternative process was the right thing to do because it was the only way a ban could be
achieved.146 At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the set of states still possessing
anti-personnel mines 147 and/or cluster munitions 148 differs from the nuclear weapons
possessor states, and even more importantly, the degree to which those states rely on
nuclear weapons for their national security is significantly higher. While several NWS also
possess anti-personnel landmines and/or cluster munitions, these weapons do not play any
major part in their defense policy, and the bulk of landmine and cluster munition possessors
is made up of developing countries and other minor players on the international stage.
Last but not least, the previous humanitarian disarmament campaigns built
networks of trust between representatives of governments, international organizations and
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NGOs. 149 Many of these professionals, who had ample experience collaborating on
disarmament, came together again in Oslo in 2013 for the first conference on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, bringing their prior expertise, strategies and
connections to the table. Despite the dominance of ICAN, these networks of veteran
disarmament experts played a decisive role in the nuclear ban initiative,150 and the concept
pioneered by the landmines and cluster munition campaigns provided fertile ground around
which ICAN could rally support. 151 In terms of state support for the TPNW process,
however, Sweden, Canada and other Western democracies who had led the previous
humanitarian campaigns were conspicuously absent.152
Discourse strategies: stigmatization and delegitimization
Like the campaigns to prohibit landmines and cluster munitions, the humanitarian
initiative to ban nuclear weapons applies the strategy of stigmatization. By effecting a
normative shift, advocates of the humanitarian initiative seek to accelerate the elimination
of nuclear weapons.153 To this end, they support measures towards disarmament on two
parallel tracks that reinforce and complement each other. The first track includes concrete
measures such as the reduction of nuclear stockpiles, de-alerting nuclear weapons, no first
use-policies, and lessening the role of nuclear weapons in national defense strategies. These
measures closely resemble the step-by-step approach advocated by some NWS. The second
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track is a more abstract, long-term campaign to stigmatize nuclear weapons by presenting
them as a threat to human security and human survival. The stigmatization and
delegitimization of nuclear weapons is meant to incentivize and facilitate the
implementation of the above-mentioned concrete disarmament measures.154 The TPNW
forms part of the second track and is declaratory rather than operational, stating that nuclear
weapons are illegal without defining a concrete roadmap for their elimination. The
assumption behind this approach is that even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms,
states are reluctant to violate taboos. As perceptions change, the burden of proof would
shift to the NWS and they would have to justify why they insist on maintaining their nuclear
weapons. 155 Once the use and even the possession of nuclear weapons have become
morally unacceptable on an international level, the assumption goes, the NWS will fall in
line.156
Another prominent concept in humanitarian discourse is that of “civilized
nations.”157 Traditionally, this denomination was most commonly used to differentiate the
liberal democracies of the West from countries of the Second and Third World. In
humanitarian discourse, civilized nations are defined as nations who respect international
humanitarian law. Through this reframing, states of the Global South have turned an
established concept onto its creators and, in connection with nuclear weapons, claimed the
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role of civilized nations for themselves.158 The reframing also provides incentives for NWS
and their allies to join the Treaty by offering moral and political benefits to states who
choose to align their military strategies with contemporary humanitarian standards. 159
Therefore, the more the NWS dismiss humanitarian concerns, the more they reinforce the
argument that the NPT regime does not effectively address the risk posed by nuclear
weapons.160
While the leftist and pacifist discourse of previous generations of anti-nuclear
activists was considered too radical to gain traction, the humanitarian approach has proven
considerably more relatable. The “affective strategy” 161 employed by ICAN and other
proponents of the nuclear ban is subtle rather than confrontational and seeks to point out
the inconsistencies between policy makers’ moral beliefs and their political actions, by
confronting them with hard facts on the one hand and personal victims’ testimonies on the
other. The purpose of these testimonies is to make the discourse on nuclear weapons less
technocratic and more emotional. While ICAN activists promoted ideas that were more
than a little revolutionary and continue to be so, they have always taken great care to deliver
their statements in the measured language of the diplomatic arena.
Moreover, some senior members of the coalition are well-versed in critical and
discursive IR theories, and these theories are reflected strongly in their campaign. Since
the younger generation of political actors has been educated by post-positivist and critical
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IR scholars as well, they might be more receptive to these theories and, for instance, more
inclined to turn to experts and use their knowledge to solve policy problems. 162 This
inclination was confirmed during the humanitarian initiative, where an active exchange of
opinions and expertise took place between state delegations and experts throughout the
campaign and especially in the negotiating phase. ICAN followed a highly data-driven
approach and meticulously documented the medical, economic, political and
environmental impact of nuclear weapons detonations. In order to ensure coherence, ICAN
distributed campaigners’ kits to its activists and developed detailed guidelines for
interactions with the media, parliamentarians and other key constituencies. ICAN activists
delivered statements at international fora and parliamentary hearings, lobbied diplomats
and reached out to civil society via social media.163
Another important component of the humanitarian initiative were the efforts to
“democratize” the disarmament discourse by giving a voice to people and actors who had
previously been silenced or simply uninvolved. Countries of the Global South as well as
civil society organizations in Europe and North America figure prominently among these
actors.164 Not only the actors, but also the target groups had to be diversified in order to
truly democratize nuclear disarmament. The general public is a key constituency for the
humanitarian initiative because it makes up the taxpayers who finance nuclear programs,
the voters who influence policy decisions in NWS, and the potential victims of a nuclear
weapons detonation. Supporters of the nuclear ban therefore need to connect with advocacy
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groups unrelated to nuclear disarmament, such as unions, environmentalists or human
rights activists, and convince them that they have a stake in the matter. Effectively framing
nuclear disarmament as a global public good will allow them to build alliances across all
sectors of society, including the business community. While human security and stability
are clearly in the best interest of the business community in general, the industries involved
in the financing, development, and manufacture of nuclear weapons must also be taken into
account. Only if all these constituencies are effectively mobilized will nuclear disarmament
ultimately be achieved.165
Despite proactive campaigning on the part of ICAN, the ICRC and others, media
coverage remained weak for the humanitarian initiative. Back in 2015, Minor already
remarked that news stories on nuclear weapons almost exclusively focused on North Korea
and used national security as a frame of analysis.166 Even the day after the adoption of the
TPNW by the UN General Assembly, the topic was absent from the front pages of major
news outlets such as the Washington Post in the US or Le Monde in France. The New York
Times did cover the story in detail, but almost exclusively from a US/UK perspective. They
focused on the rejection of the Treaty by NATO members and neglected to mention the
amount of support it received from states of the Global South, among others.167 One of my
interviewees heartily agreed with this perception and lamented the lack of coverage of the
humanitarian campaign in the French media, labelling it “deliberate disinformation.”168
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Chapter 6
Principal actors and their collaboration
This chapter takes a closer look at the main actors – states, international
organizations, experts, NGOs and other civil society groups – and how they collaborated
to create and advance the humanitarian impact initiative. At the same time, I elaborate on
my argument that the initiative owes a large part of its success to the close and constructive
collaboration between state actors and civil society and that it set a precedent in terms of
smaller states and states of the Global South assuming active roles in nuclear disarmament.
Potter highlights the two tracks of the humanitarian impact initiative, which was
spearheaded by NGOs on the one hand, and a number of interested states, notably Norway,
Switzerland and Austria, on the other. These states contributed funding to the movement
and advocated for it in various diplomatic fora such as the NPT conferences and meetings
and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The participating NGOs
complemented these efforts with their own civil society and outreach activities.
Representatives of both tracks remained in contact throughout, and although their interests
did not always coincide perfectly, their initiatives were sufficiently aligned to be mutually
reinforcing.169
Key civil society actors
Borrie et al. point out the difficulty of assessing the concrete influence of civil
society actors on the Treaty negotiations. Comparing the initial draft to the final text or
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comparing delegations’ positions at different stages of the process does not prove causality,
nor does it account for the possible influence of other actors, such as international
organizations.170 Therefore, this chapter discusses the involvement, the initiatives and the
engagement of various civil society actors without attempting to assess their concrete
impact.
The civil society group most commonly associated with the TPNW is ICAN, due
in no small part to the fact that ICAN was awarded the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize “for its
work to draw attention to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear
weapons and for its ground-breaking efforts to achieve a treaty-based prohibition of such
weapons.”171 ICAN is a global coalition of 468 NGOs from over 100 different countries,
who work together for a strong and effective treaty banning nuclear weapons.172 ICAN was
launched at the 2007 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna, upon an initiative by
the NGO International Physicians against Nuclear War. 173 ICAN is headquartered in
Geneva and is organized around a team of currently six international staff (including
Executive Director Beatrice Fihn), as well as partner organizations and an international
steering group, in which ten organizations are represented (Acronym Institute for
Disarmament Diplomacy, African Council of Religious Leaders – Religions for Peace,
Article 36, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Latin America
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Human Security Network, Norwegian People’s Aid, PAX, Peace Boat, Swedish Physicians
against Nuclear Weapons, and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom).174
ICAN served as civil society coordinator for each of the three conferences on the
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and lobbied for the establishment of the OEWG
in Geneva as well as for the adoption of the negotiating mandate for the TPNW.175 Through
its partners, ICAN contributed essential expertise by organizing several informal
workshops for diplomats, activists, staff of international organizations and researchers. The
workshops fostered exchange and dialogue between these actors.176
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) played a less public, but no
less important role in the humanitarian initiative, and has been invested in nuclear
disarmament from the advent of the nuclear age. The ICRC is part of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement, along with the International Federation of Red Cross
and Red Crescent Societies and the 191 National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.177
The ICRC is neither an NGO nor an international organization, but a private association
under the Swiss Civil Code. Its functions and activities (centered around assistance to
victims of conflict) are founded in international law (the Geneva Conventions) and
mandated by the international community.178
In 2009, shortly before the humanitarian initiative began to take shape, the ICRC
published extensive research on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and
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on countries’ nuclear disaster preparedness. 179 As described in Chapter Four, it was a
speech by a former ICRC president in Geneva in 2010 that brought the humanitarian
consequences of nuclear weapons to the attention of the diplomatic community. The ICRC
was present at each of the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
During the Treaty negotiations, the ICRC particularly advocated for the mention of
international humanitarian law and the inclusion of victim assistance provisions.180 Due to
its observer status at the UN General Assembly, the ICRC delegation had access to all
meetings and documents, enabling it to play the role of both expert and convener. Members
of the ICRC delegation organized meetings with like-minded states and provided input for
the Treaty text. Although they collaborated with ICAN and occasionally related
information on meetings to which NGOs did not have access, the ICRC did not engage in
any joint action with ICAN and endeavored to occupy the middle ground between states
and NGOs and act as a mediator between them. 181 During its most recent Council of
Delegates in November 2017, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
adopted a four-year action plan to promote adherence to the TPNW. 182 One hundred
National Societies were mobilized to support Treaty ratification in their respective
countries, including National Societies in nuclear-dependent states like Japan.183
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Principal state actors
As mentioned before, the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW draw the majority
of their support from small states and states of the Global South. At the same time, they
lack the support of the great powers. One author goes so far as to call the adoption of the
TPNW:
… the first time an instrument of international humanitarian law has been
forced into existence against the fierce opposition of the major powers and
the majority of European states.184
India and Pakistan attended all the humanitarian conferences, perhaps in an attempt
to be seen as responsible nuclear powers committed to disarmament.185 Needless to say,
neither of them attended the negotiating conference or showed any inclination to join the
TPNW so far. With the P5 as well as Germany and Japan in firm opposition, the closest
the TPNW has come to a major power supporter is Brazil.186 Brazil was also among the six
states whose delegations were honored with the 2018 Arms Control Person of the Year
Award for their extraordinary engagement in bringing about the TPNW. The other award
recipients were Austria, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Ambassador
Elayne Whyte Gómez of Costa Rica, the President of the 2017 negotiating conference.187
This distinction by the Arms Control Association can be considered the insider’s point of
view of who played the most important roles in the process.
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The following section will discuss briefly how smaller states operate in multilateral
negotiations. They find themselves at a disadvantage in several aspects: Apart from their
modest political and economic weight, they have fewer resources at their disposal on the
diplomatic stage as well. Their delegations tend to be smaller and their governmental
institutions employ fewer experts in a given field. Their success therefore depends strongly
on the individual negotiators, who have to shoulder a greater workload.188 This assessment
was corroborated during the interviews I conducted. In the case of Austria, only five
officials shared the task of supporting the humanitarian initiative and negotiating the
TPNW: three in the disarmament department of the Foreign Ministry in Vienna, one at the
Permanent Mission in New York, and two at the Permanent Mission in Geneva. This
exemplifies how much a small group of people with few resources can achieve in a
multilateral forum if they are competent, motivated and well-coordinated.189
Also due to their limited resources, smaller states are forced to prioritize and to
focus their diplomatic efforts on a select few issues.190 Austria, and to a degree Norway
and Switzerland, are examples of small states who chose to focus their energy on the issue
of nuclear disarmament.191 And yet, Norway is also the best example for Borrie et al.’s
assertion that “[in] politics, nothing happens in a vacuum” 192 and that the influence of
external circumstances on the humanitarian initiative must be taken into account. Norway’s
left-wing government, which was in office until 2013, generously supported nuclear
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disarmament research and activism with an annual budget of around 175 million
Norwegian Crowns (around 22,5 million USD) and was the main donor for ICAN and
International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. 193 When a conservative
government came into power, however, the country began to withdraw its support for the
humanitarian initiative, both politically through abstentions on relevant votes in the UN
General Assembly, and financially through the suspension of funding for the abovementioned NGOs from 2015 onwards.194 As this example shows, the future of the TPNW
depends as much on domestic political developments in different countries as it does on
the engagement of its advocates. Austria has a long-standing history of supporting nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, and despite the recent change of government, it
continues to be one of the main supporters of the humanitarian initiative on the diplomatic
stage and also contributes funding to NGOs and research centers, such as ICAN Austria
and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.195 The Holy See played an
important role in the humanitarian initiative as well,196 both through the active participation
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of its Observer Mission and through the video messages Pope Francis sent to the Vienna
Conference197 and to the first round of Treaty negotiations in March 2017.198
The strategies available to these small states in the international arena include
collaboration with specialized agencies and NGOs as well as coalition-building.199 The
states spearheading the humanitarian initiative began to build their base of support in the
First Committee of the UN General Assembly as early as 2012, when the draft resolution
entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” was first
introduced.200 Nevertheless, the coalition was not as clearly defined as it had been for the
Ottawa Convention. Even for those working directly on the issue, it was at times difficult
to determine which states actually formed part of the core group.201 A closer look at the
states who sponsored the above-mentioned draft resolution from the 67th through the 72nd
session of the General Assembly reveals the shifting composition of the coalition
supporting the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW. The number of sponsors increased
from 13 in 2012 (mandating the first OEWG) to 23 in 2015 (mandating the second OEWG),
to 34 in 2016 (mandating the Treaty negotiations) and 40 in 2017. Eight states sponsored
the draft resolution at every session: Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Liechtenstein,
Mexico, Nigeria, and the Philippines. New Zealand and Peru sponsored all drafts but one.

For a transcript of the “Message of His Holiness Pope Francis
on the Occasion of the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” see:
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/pont-messages/2014/documents/papafrancesco_20141207_messaggio-conferenza-vienna-nucleare.html.
198
For a transcript of the “Message of His Holiness Pope Francis to the United Nations Conference to
Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards Their Total
Elimination” see: https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/pontmessages/2017/documents/papa-francesco_20170323_messaggio-onu.html.
199
Panke, Diana (2012) “Small states in multilateral negotiations: What have we learned?” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs Vol. 25 (3): p. 390.
200
UN document symbol: A/C.1/67/L.46.
201
Interview conducted by the author on February 28, 2018.
197

59

It is also worth noting that several European states involved in previous humanitarian
disarmament initiatives sponsored the resolution initially, but withdrew their support when
the idea of a treaty began to take shape. These states include Iceland, Denmark, Norway
and Switzerland. Several African and Latin American states took over instead and joined
the list of sponsors from the 70th session onwards. Among them were Brazil, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Guatemala, Kenya, Namibia, Panama, South
Africa, Venezuela and Uruguay. 202 In light of the existing NWFZ in Africa and Latin
America, the support of states from these regions is hardly surprising. Yet, smaller states,
particularly in the Global South, have been facing considerable pressure from their nucleararmed allies, such as France, not to support the TPNW.203
The role of the UN
Although the conferences in Norway, Mexico and Austria were held as stand-alone
events on the initiative of the respective governments and outside of a larger institutional
framework, the UN came to play an important part in the latter stages of the humanitarian
initiative. The process was advanced by several General Assembly resolutions and the
debates in the First Committee that preceded them, as described in Chapter Four.
The rules of procedure of the General Assembly, where consensus is not required
and each state has one vote regardless of its political power, worked to the advantage of
the humanitarian initiative. The institutional framework of the General Assembly was
chosen for this very reason, according to Dunworth204 and several of my interviewees. This

202

See Annex, Tables 1 and 2.
Interview conducted by the author on November 12, 2017.
204
Dunworth, Treasa (2015) “Pursuing ‘effective measures’ relating to nuclear disarmament: Ways of
making a legal obligation a reality” International Review of the Red Cross Vol. 97 (899): p. 612.
203

60

practical choice goes hand in hand with the theory that multilateralism and the framework
of international institutions with majority-based decision-making rules empower small
states and give them an opportunity to further their agenda by building coalitions.205 In
defiance of the common perception that institutions like the UN were created by and for
the major powers, 206 small and medium-sized states effectively instrumentalized the
institutional framework of the UN to further the humanitarian initiative.
Furthermore, institutional expertise can serve to compensate for small states’ lack
of resources or technical competency.207 In the case of the TPNW negotiations, the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) provided essential technical support,
and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has done
considerable policy research related to the Treaty.208 Nonetheless, UNODA staff members
need to tread carefully, since they are also mandated to uphold the NPT. If UNODA is seen
to be invested in the humanitarian initiative beyond its concrete General Assembly
mandate, the department and/or its staff members may face a backlash from NWS.209
In IR theory, international organizations are often described as actors, fora and/or
resources.210 In the case of the TPNW, the UN served both as a resource, as detailed above,
and as a forum. Like-minded states have been using the General Assembly as a forum for
the humanitarian initiative since the resolution entitled “Taking forward multilateral
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disarmament negotiations” was first introduced in the First Committee at the 67th session
of the GA. Later, the mandates for the OEWG and for the Treaty negotiations themselves
were obtained through the GA. The OEWG in turn served as a forum for further discussion
and the concretization of ideas for a legal instrument banning nuclear weapons. Finally, the
UN served as a forum for the actual Treaty negotiations, contributing both the physical
infrastructure and the resources of its experts in UNODA, the Office for Legal Affairs and
other departments. UN officials generally avoid creating the impression that they are active
agents in intergovernmental processes.211 Therefore, the substantial work they contribute
behind the scenes as organizers, experts, assistants and advisers tends to remain
unrecognized, especially compared to the public and widely communicated efforts of
NGOs.
The collaboration between state and civil society actors
At the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Costa Rica declared in reference to the
humanitarian initiative that “democracy has come to nuclear disarmament.” 212 This
statement rings true in several ways: Firstly, the TPNW was elaborated under majoritybased rules of procedure, giving every state the same voice and successfully avoiding the
hijacking of the agenda by a few powerful actors. Secondly, NGOs played a decisive role
throughout the humanitarian initiative and, compared to other disarmament fora such as
the CD, NGOs were granted better access even during the intergovernmental stage.
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Thirdly, the Treaty text itself sets a precedent by expressly recognizing the role of NGOs
and the role of women in disarmament.213
The individual actions of the above-mentioned stakeholders are only part of the
story, however. Ultimately it was their collaboration that made the humanitarian initiative
successful, along with the networks of trust between diplomats, scholars, experts, activists
and international civil servants that previously existed in the disarmament community and
were strengthened throughout the humanitarian impact movement. The present chapter has
introduced several examples of this collaboration, interaction and exchange between state
and civil society actors. ICAN itself was founded at the margins of an NPT conference and
for many years drew the majority of its funding from the Norwegian government. While
the ICRC and NGOs were the first to bring attention to the humanitarian impact of nuclear
weapons, the simultaneously growing frustration with the NPT regime among NNWS
provided fertile ground for this novel approach to nuclear disarmament. States took the
initiative to organize the humanitarian conferences, but invited civil society actors to
contribute actively and substantively to the discussion. It was not only ideas that flowed
between states and NGOs, but also human capital. For instance, most of ICAN’s staff in
Vienna previously worked as interns at the Austrian Foreign Ministry during the
organization of the Vienna conference.214 During the intergovernmental process, NGOs
offered their expertise to diplomats and generated media attention. At the same time,
bilateral contacts with delegations allowed NGOs to stay informed on the goings-on in
closed meetings and consultations.215 Information thus flowed in both directions in a kind
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of symbiotic relationship. In the ongoing implementation phase of the Treaty, interested
states can reach out diplomatically to other states, while NGOs are more effective in
leading media campaigns and fostering grass-roots movements in support of the TPNW.
The close working relationship between like-minded states and NGOs also became evident
at the Nobel Peace Prize awards ceremony, where ICAN passed on some of its 50 tickets
to state representatives who had played a major role in the humanitarian initiative. 216
Where Potter observes a two-track approach,217 I see only one path taken by a multitude of
actors, intermingling and forming groups, first with one group leading the way, then
another. Some joined along the way while others broke off, and actors collaborated to find
the best route.
The humanitarian initiative does bear some characteristics of a transnational
advocacy network, as evoked by Borrie et al. 218 The range of actors involved (NGOs,
government officials, the UN) is reminiscent of a network, and so are the exchange between
the actors, the common goal, the reframing of the issue of nuclear disarmament, the use of
information policies and the normative approach. 219 Other aspects, however, are less
typical of an advocacy network. My observations have shown that the distinction between
the members of the network and their target group (the states they seek to influence) is
blurred and has changed over time. Some states (like Norway) started out as network
advocates, but have now become the object of lobbying from the same network. More
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generally, states are found on both sides of the line: some are advocates for the
humanitarian initiative, others are targets for network advocacy. This further demonstrates
that the humanitarian initiative defies existing theoretical frameworks, differs from
previous initiatives in the same field, and does indeed constitute a novel approach.
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Chapter 7
The negotiating conferences and the Treaty text
As discussed in Chapter Four, the negotiating mandate for the TPNW was officially
granted by the UN General Assembly in December 2016 with the adoption of its resolution
71/258, in which it decided to “convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate
a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total
elimination,”220 and encouraged “all member states to participate in the conference.”221
Unsurprisingly, there was immediate pushback from the NWS. A Russian diplomat in the
First Committee bluntly stated that under the NPT, Russia was entitled to possess nuclear
weapons, and called the mandated negotiations destructive and catastrophic, while at the
same time ridiculing any attempt to tackle disarmament in the absence of the P5.222 The
same sense of entitlement to nuclear weapons was professed by the UK223 and France,224
who closely associate their status as permanent members of the Security Council with their
possession of nuclear weapons. A document circulated by the US among NATO members
discouraged any participation in the Treaty negotiations. The same document also listed
the potential negative political and military consequences of a nuclear weapons ban for the
alliance. These concerns included “delegitimizing the concept of nuclear deterrence,
undermining the longstanding strategic stability” and the prospect that it may become
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“impossible to undertake nuclear planning or training […] or nuclear-related transit
through territorial airspace or seas.”225 These reactions reflect the growing concern among
NWS that the humanitarian initiative, which they had previously chosen to ignore or
dismiss, might have an impact on them after all if it produced a concrete legal instrument.
The reactions also expose one of the inherent contradictions in public statements made by
NWS both before and after the negotiations: The Treaty can hardly be both irrelevant and
dangerous at the same time.
There were 135 states, including two thirds of all NPT states parties, officially
represented at the negotiating conferences. The size of their respective delegations gave an
indication of their level of dedication to the Treaty process, with Austria, Brazil, Costa
Rica, Ghana, the Holy See, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa and Thailand sending
especially large delegations. 226 The NWS and most of their allies were conspicuously
absent. The only NATO member to break rank was the Netherlands, where the NGO PAX
had launched a petition effecting a debate in Parliament. The Dutch Parliament then
obliged the government to participate in the negotiations despite enormous pressure from
the US, the UK and France. 227 The boycott by the NWS and their allies was quite
unprecedented – never before had a group of states downright refused to attend treaty
negotiations mandated by the UN General Assembly. 228 Thakur even went so far as to
claim that the boycott placed the NWS and their allies in non-compliance with Article VI
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of the NPT.229 Others observed that having fewer parties and especially fewer contradicting
interests at the table would raise the common denominator and lead to a more substantial
agreement.230
Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the
United Nations Office in Geneva, was chosen as President of the conference, with the
representatives of Austria, Chile, Indonesia, Iran, Morocco, New Zealand and South Africa
serving as vice-presidents. The main facilitators of the Treaty process wanted a Genevabased ambassador, who would be well-versed in disarmament issues, as President of the
Conference. Costa Rica had a credible track record of supporting not only the humanitarian
initiative, but also previous nuclear disarmament initiatives like the 1997 model nuclear
weapons convention (discussed in Chapter Four).231 Other core advocates such as Mexico
and Austria chose not to chair the conference because they believed they could better serve
the humanitarian agenda by investing their full diplomatic capacities into negotiating as
states parties.232
During the conferences, NGOs were allowed to submit statements, display their
material at a designated table, set up exhibits and organize side events in a separate
conference room. 233 NGOs also used their access to the conference to directly lobby
government representatives, and they published articles expressing their views as well as
reports on the progress of the negotiations on their own platforms.234
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The March negotiations
The United Nations Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to
Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading Towards their Total Elimination held its first
substantive session at UN headquarters in New York from March 27 to March 31, 2017.
The high-level segment with a general debate took up the first two days of the conference.
The subsequent discussions were structured around three topics (principles and objectives,
core prohibitions, and institutional arrangements). Delegations were invited to comment
on each of the topics, and before moving on to the next topic, a number of civil society
representatives were accorded speaking-time.235
In the absence of a formal preparatory process for the negotiations, many
governments had not yet fully formed their positions. This left accredited NGOs with more
room to promote their ideas and gave the President greater independence in the formulation
of the first draft.236 On the other hand, the important question of the scope of the proposed
legal instrument was reopened and took up a substantial amount of time during the March
negotiations. Some of the main advocates of the humanitarian initiative, including Mexico,
Austria and Brazil, favored a narrow treaty – a political statement that could be negotiated
rapidly rather than a fundamental altering of international legal norms. Iran and Egypt were
among those who called for a comprehensive and ambitious legal instrument, even if or
perhaps because such an endeavor would require lengthy and complex negotiations.237
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The general discussions were exhausted after three days due to the abovementioned lack of clear negotiating positions among the delegations. Therefore, the two
informal question-and-answer sessions led by civil society and ICRC experts on the fourth
day were perhaps the most defining elements of the March session. They helped
governments clarify a number of complex technical and legal issues and shape their
national positions.238 Ambassador Whyte prepared a first draft of the TPNW based on the
views and preferences expressed by member states at the first round of negotiations, with
substantive support from UNODA. She did not circulate the text until after the conclusion
of the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna in May 2017 in order to avoid any
interference between the two processes.239 The first draft was finally issued in Geneva on
May 22, 2017.240
The June/July negotiations
The second session of the negotiating conference took place in New York from
June 15 to July 7, 2017. An open reading of the draft took up the first five days, allowing
delegations to express their views on the text and propose revisions. Delegations had the
opportunity to comment on each paragraph and many took the floor repeatedly. When the
reading of the preamble was concluded, civil society representatives were invited to speak,
and representatives of ICAN and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear
War as well as seven other speakers took the floor. At the end of the intergovernmental
discussions on the crucial first paragraph (containing the prohibitions), there were six more
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interventions by civil society representatives (ICAN, WILPF, International Association of
Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, PAX, Unfold Zero, and Japan Federation of Bar
Associations).241 This alternation between state and civil society speakers was an attempt
by the President of the conference, Ambassador Whyte, to strike a balance between the
open and unconventional nature of the process so far (i.e. the high level of civil society
participation and leadership in the humanitarian initiative) and the expectations of state
representatives accustomed to more private settings for intergovernmental negotiations.242
The same pattern continued for each paragraph or set of paragraphs. The delegations most
active during the plenary discussions (at both sessions) included Brazil (23 interventions),
Cuba (22), Austria (20), Ireland (20), Nigeria (19), Ecuador (19), Iran (18), Egypt (18),
Mexico (17), Indonesia (17), Sweden (17) and New Zealand (16).243 Both supporters and
sceptics of the Treaty process can be found among the frequent speakers, and even the
advocates of the Treaty occasionally expressed divergent views on certain provisions.244
Among the more contentious points were the possible prohibition on transit, the scope of
the prohibition on nuclear testing, 245 and how the responsibilities for victim assistance
would be shared. 246 Nonetheless, several of my interviewees noted that, due to a basic
consensus among the participating states on the desired outcome, the negotiations for the
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TPNW were uncharacteristically harmonious in comparison to other disarmament
negotiations they had attended.247 Even civil society representatives in attendance found
the atmosphere “constructive and dynamic.”248
On June 22, the first reading was complete. The President then produced a revised
preamble and on June 27, the first revision of entire draft.249 The most significant changes
from the original draft to the first revision concerned Article 4 on the accession of NWS to
the Treaty.250 (The Treaty text will be discussed in detail in the following section.) The
conference then entered into full negotiating mode with numerous informal discussions
and closed meetings. No verbatim records were kept of those meetings, making it harder
to reconstruct the negotiating history from here on out.251 Among the informal meetings
were two panel discussions spontaneously arranged by the President. They allowed
delegates to seek the advice of independent experts on verifying the elimination of nuclear
weapons and on transit through national territory.252 In order to expedite the negotiations
and bring them to a successful conclusion by July 7, the President divided the text into four
clusters and appointed facilitators to lead parallel consultations on each cluster. The
President herself led the consultations on Article 1 (General obligations), Ireland led
Articles 2 to 5 (Declarations; Safeguards; Elimination; Additional measures), Chile
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Articles 6 to 8 (National implementation; Victim assistance and environmental
remediation; International cooperation) and Indonesia (later replaced by Thailand) Articles
9 to 21 (Meeting of states parties; Costs; Amendments; Settlement of disputes;
Universality; Signature; Ratification; Entry into force, Reservations; Duration and
withdrawal; Relations with other agreements; Depositary; Authentic texts). All of these
meetings were closed, and NGOs were not invited to attend.253 The parallel meetings posed
a challenge for some of the smaller delegations, who did not have enough diplomats in
their ranks to be represented at each of the clusters,254 especially since it was these smallerscale, informal meetings where the actual deals were cut.255 Based on these consultations,
the facilitators each submitted a revised draft of their respective clusters to the President,
who then incorporated them into the second revision of the draft, circulated on July 3.256
At this point, the conference was already operating on a tight schedule, since the
delegations required time to obtain feedback from their capitals, and the translators
required time to produce true copies in the six official languages. A final review of the text
was held on July 5, allowing all delegations to state their official positions regarding the
latest draft. The text remained almost unchanged; the only contentious points being the
right to withdraw from the Treaty and the provision of victim’s assistance and
environmental remediation by states who had used or tested nuclear weapons.257 On July 7,
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2017, the conference adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons with a
vote of 122 in favor, one against (the Netherlands) and one abstention (Singapore).258 There
had been hope of adopting the Treaty by acclamation until the Netherlands presented an
objection and a formal vote had to be called. It is worth noting, however, that other
delegations who had been critical during the negotiations, such as Iran and Egypt,
ultimately did vote in favor of the final draft. In their official statement following the vote,
the Netherlands explained that the Treaty was incompatible with their commitments under
NATO and further lamented the absence of concrete verification mechanisms. Singapore
declared having abstained on account of legal uncertainty in relation to existing nuclear
disarmament instruments. A large number of states pronounced congratulatory statements,
some in their national capacity, others on behalf of regional groups. The meeting ended
with interventions by the ICRC, ICAN and a survivor of the Hiroshima bombing. 259
The Treaty text
This section will document the evolution of the Treaty text from the first draft to
the final adopted text. It will also highlight some of the key provisions of the Treaty and
discuss their possible significance for the impact of the Treaty on the multilateral nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation regime.
When Ambassador Whyte drafted the Treaty text with the assistance of UNODA
experts, she borrowed the wording of many technical aspects from NWFZ treaties, the
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NPT, the CTBT or the Ottawa Convention.260 As mentioned above, the tenor of the text
and the selection of included provisions were based on the President’s notes, the statements
made by delegations at the first negotiating session, and the working papers submitted by
states, the ICRC and OPANAL.261 The result was a relatively concise draft text of eight
pages, comprising a 15-paragraph preamble, 21 articles and an annex concerning
safeguards. 262 (Safeguards provisions were later included in Article 3.) The President
intended this first draft as a basis for consensus that the June/July negotiations could build
on and that deliberately left open more contentious issues that required further
discussion.263 The extensive changes made to the first draft are a testament to the amount
of substantive and technical work that took place during the June/July negotiations. The
largest number of changes is apparent between the first draft and the first revision circulated
on June 20 (preamble) and June 27 (operative paragraphs).
The following analysis of the provisions of the adopted Treaty text and, to the extent
possible, the evolution of the text during the June/July conference takes into account the
amendments submitted in writing by member states until June 20 264 as well as the
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comments submitted by the ICRC 265 and the response published online by Reaching
Critical Will.266
The function of a preamble is to state the purpose of the Treaty and states’
motivation for adopting it, and to provide context for the interpretation of the Treaty
provisions.267 As expected, the preamble of the TPNW starts with an expression of concern
about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and later recalls
the unacceptable suffering caused to victims. In reference to the beginnings of the
humanitarian initiative, the preamble laments the “slow pace of nuclear disarmament” and
declares that “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to […] international
humanitarian law” and “abhorrent to the principles of humanity.” This last passage reflects
the intention of the Treaty’s architects to stigmatize and delegitimize nuclear weapons.
The preamble was considerably expanded during the drafting phase to include
several additional references, e.g. to human rights law, to the danger posed by “detonation
by accident, miscalculation or design”, as well as the fact that “the consequences of nuclear
weapons cannot be adequately addressed, transcend borders [and] pose grave implications
for human survival.” The principles of international humanitarian law were spelled out in
detail and several other paragraphs were reformulated to avoid ambiguity. An additional
paragraph recalling the prohibition of the threat or use of force under the UN Charter was
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added, and upon the request of several states, the “inalienable right” to the “use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes” is explicitly mentioned in the final text. One of my
interviewees noted the absence of any mention of delivery mechanisms in the Treaty.268
Means of delivery were referenced in preambular paragraph 8 of the first draft, but deleted
from later versions. Reaching Critical Will, the Swedish delegation and others sought to
strengthen the mention of women. The disproportionate impact of radiation on women and
girls as well as women’s important role in achieving nuclear disarmament both made it into
the final text, setting the TPNW apart for its inclusiveness.
Article 1 of the Treaty was originally titled “General obligations,” but changed to
“Prohibitions” in the July 3 version (second revised draft). It contains the core provision of
the Treaty, namely that states parties shall never “[d]evelop, test, produce, manufacture,
otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.” The first article also prohibits the transfer and the stationing of nuclear weapons,
a provision particularly relevant to NATO members who currently host US nuclear bases
on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey). Although the use
of nuclear weapons is of course prohibited under Article 1, the threat of use was not
included in the first draft and only added later on the behest of several delegations. The
question of transit of nuclear weapons through national territory or territorial waters was
discussed at length during the conference, but no agreement was reached.269 Many called
for a mention of transit in Article 1, but others doubted the practicability of such a
provision, arguing that states cannot reasonably account for all items shipped through their
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territory. Although this argument appears to contradict existing mechanisms to control
fissile materials, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 270 the prevailing view was that
transit could be considered a part of assistance, which is prohibited pursuant to paragraph
1 (e). The same argument was used to dismiss calls for a prohibition on financing,
designing and researching nuclear weapons. Concerning nuclear testing, the TPNW
reflects the prohibitions contained in the CTBT. This was agreed upon in order to avoid
creating parallel regimes, despite some states parties (notably Mexico) calling for more
comprehensive prohibitions including computer-simulated tests and subcritical tests.271
The discussions on Articles 2 to 4 all revolved around one issue: how to deal with
NWS in the context of the Treaty. The initial draft would have required NWS to completely
eliminate their nuclear arsenals before joining the Treaty. It soon became clear, however,
that a more flexible and nuanced approach was needed to create a treaty open to all states
not only in theory, but also in practice. In this respect, South Africa played a key role. Due
to its experience as a former NWS, South Africa was able to compensate, at least partially,
for the fact that that these provisions had to be drafted without any input from the current
NWS.272 For Article 2 (Declarations), South Africa proposed language requiring that each
state party declare its status in relation to nuclear weapons. This language effectively
divides states into four categories: (1) those who have not owned or housed nuclear
weapons or explosive devices since the Treaty’s adoption on July 7, 2017; (2) those who
possessed nuclear weapons as of July 7, 2017 and eliminated them prior to joining the
Treaty; (3) those who continue to own nuclear weapons even as they join the Treaty; and
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(4) those who have foreign-owned nuclear weapons stationed on their territory even as they
join the Treaty. It is worth noting that according to Article 4, states like South Africa, who
eliminated their nuclear arsenals and nuclear programs prior to the adoption of the Treaty,
fall under the first category and are not distinguished from states who never owned or
developed nuclear weapons at all. Similarly, the new Treaty eliminates any distinction
between the five NPT-sanctioned NWS and the four NWS outside the NPT.273 For each
category of states, Article 4 sets out adequate procedures for joining the Treaty as well as
corresponding obligations. According to this article, entitled “Towards the total elimination
of nuclear weapons,” states in category (2) must conclude a special safeguards agreement
with the IAEA and submit to verification by a “competent international authority” (Art. 4,
para. 1). This authority was not further specified during the Treaty negotiations and its
nature is left to be determined at future meetings of the states parties. States in category (3)
must “immediately remove [their nuclear weapons] from operational status” and submit a
legally binding, time-bound plan for the “verified and irreversible elimination” of their
nuclear weapons program within 150 days after ratifying the Treaty (Art. 4, para. 2). Once
the elimination is complete, the states in question must negotiate a special safeguards
agreement with the IAEA. States in category (4) are required to “ensure the prompt
removal” of all nuclear weapons from their territory (Art. 4, para. 4).
These provisions undoubtedly make the Treaty more inclusive and more open to
future ratification by NWS or their allies, one of the declared aims of ICAN and other
Treaty advocates. However, I also see potential challenges related to the implementation
of Article 4. First and foremost, the Treaty does not specify fixed timelines for the
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elimination of the nuclear arsenals of states joining under paragraph 2. Nor is there a
specified deadline for the removal of nuclear weapons or any mention of a dedicated
safeguards agreement for states joining under paragraph 4. One could argue that NNWS
hold the majority of votes at the meetings of states parties, where further details will be
determined, and that this will ensure that the purpose of the Treaty is upheld and the
weapons in question are rapidly eliminated. At the same time, it is worth remembering that
NNWS also hold the majority of votes at the NPT Review Conferences, and yet progress
under Article VI of the NPT has been negligible. Consequently, I see a potential danger of
NWS joining the TPNW with the aim of deliberately holding its agenda hostage by
delaying the implementation of Art. 4, para. 2. Small states and states of the Global South,
who make up the majority of current TPNW signatories, could be susceptible to diplomatic
and political pressure by NWS, and the TPNW could eventually suffer the same fate as the
NPT. Such a scenario appears unlikely at the moment due to the categorical opposition of
the NWS to the TPNW, but as the new Treaty gains traction, the NWS may yet change
their tactics.
Another potential challenge related to Article 4 lies in the verification of Treaty
obligations and the fact that the “competent international authority” needs to be defined,
agreed on, founded, staffed and financed before it can begin its work. This could be a
further cause for delays in Treaty implementation and the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Alternatively, IAEA could assume the role of competent international authority. However,
there has not been any official cooperation or exchange between the TPNW negotiating
conference and IAEA. Ambassador Whyte sent a letter to the Director-General of the IAEA
requesting the Agency’s participation in the negotiating conferences, and the matter was
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discussed at a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, but in the end, the agency did not
send any representatives or experts.274 This development is a reminder that the IAEA is
closely connected to the NPT regime and the NWS, which could lead to potential
difficulties if additional safeguards are required under Article 4, paras. 1 or 3 of the TPNW.
Article 3 requires that states in category (1) either maintain their existing IAEA safeguards
obligations or conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA if they have not
already done so. Perhaps surprisingly, states in category (4) need not negotiate any
additional safeguards agreements. The TPNW thus effectively maintains the standard of
safeguards established by the NPT in 1972 and makes no attempt to strengthen it.275
Among the most progressive aspects of the TPNW are the victim assistance and
environmental remediation provisions in Article 6. They oblige states parties to provide
assistance to any individuals under their jurisdiction who have been affected by the use or
testing of nuclear weapons. Similar obligations can also be found in the Convention on
Cluster Munitions (Article 5) and, to a lesser degree, in the Ottawa Convention (with the
qualifier “states in a position to do so”). A new addition is the obligation for states who
have used or tested nuclear weapons to provide assistance to affected states parties under
Article 7 of the TPNW. This provision was not included in early drafts and is likely a result
of determined advocacy by the ICRC, other civil society organizations and several states,
including Brazil, in favor of strengthening the victim assistance provisions. Although it
only seems fair to expect states who used or tested nuclear weapons to take responsibility
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for the human and environmental consequences, such a potentially costly obligation might
also deter NWS from joining the Treaty.
Pursuant to Article 8, a meeting of the states parties will be convened by the UN
Secretary-General within one year of the entry into force of the Treaty, and on a biennial
basis thereafter. The rules of procedure for these meetings are not determined by the Treaty,
but will be adopted at the first session. The first review conference is scheduled to take
place five years after the entry into force, and further review conferences every six years
thereafter, perhaps to avoid coinciding with NPT review conferences on a regular basis.
The ICRC, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, NGOs,
relevant entities of the UN system, other international organizations, regional organizations
as well as states not party to the Treaty are expressly invited to attend the meetings and
conferences as observers, continuing the tradition of inclusiveness and openness that
characterized the humanitarian initiative. The costs for these meetings and conferences, as
well as the related costs incurred by the UN Secretariat, are to be covered by the states
parties and any participating observer states. In the case of the TPNW, this common
practice could imply budget issues and place financial constraints on a future Treaty body,
since neither the traditional major donors nor the states paying high assessed contributions
are among the current signatories. 276 Provisions for the costs of verification and
disarmament (to be borne by the states parties to which they apply) were only included in
the draft on July 3; an indication that agreement on this issue was not reached until the very
end of the negotiations. This arrangement means that states in categories (1) and (4) will
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not incur any additional costs for verification, provided they already have a comprehensive
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. States parties have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty in the event that “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty
have jeopardized the supreme interests” of the state in question (Art. 17, para. 2). The
timelines and modalities for withdrawal were subject to intense discussions during the
negotiations and were updated in the July 3 draft, in which the period required for a
withdrawal to take effect was changed from 3 to 12 months. Upon initiative of the ICRC,
among others, the additional condition, whereby a withdrawal can only take effect if the
state in question is not party to an armed conflict, was strengthened to apply to intra-state
as well as inter-state conflicts.
The TPNW was completed in less than seven months from the adoption of its
negotiating mandate and with less than four weeks of actual negotiations,277 a remarkably
short period of time for a multilateral treaty and especially for a disarmament instrument.
According to Ambassador Whyte, the negotiators were able to keep the timeframe due to
a shared sense of purpose that allowed them to quickly resolve procedural questions that
had paralyzed past disarmament negotiations and move on to the substance of the Treaty
almost immediately. The engagement of civil society organizations and academia helped
create a sense of ownership and confidence in the outcome of the negotiations.278
The present analysis of the negotiating conferences and the Treaty text has
reinforced the impression of an open, participatory drafting process that welcomed input
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by civil society and by a wide range of national delegations. To the extent documented,
particular engagement was demonstrated by the Treaty’s main facilitators (including
Austria, Brazil, Ireland, New Zealand and South Africa) as well as by several states of the
Global South (including Cuba, Argentina and Ecuador, who submitted detailed
amendments).
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Chapter 8
Reception and impact of the Treaty
State positions and the ratification process
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was opened for signature during
the high-level segment of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly on September 20,
2017, following an Opening Ceremony presided by Secretary-General António Guterres,
the depositary of the Treaty.279 Pursuant to its Article 15, the Treaty will enter into force
90 days after the 50th instrument of ratification has been deposited. Fifty states signed the
Treaty immediately on September 20, 2017.280 As of April 2018, the Treaty counts a total
of 58 signatories and seven states parties. 281 It has now entered the ratification phase,
during which signatory states set in motion the required domestic procedures for
ratification according to their constitution, such as parliamentary approval or an executive
order. Depending on the system in place and the political dynamics, this process can take
several months or years to complete. Meyer and Sauer estimate that the Treaty will enter
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into force in late 2018 or mid-2019. 282 A comparison with other disarmament treaties
shows that this timeframe is quite optimistic: The Biological Weapons Convention, the
Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions each took about
three years to reach fifty ratifications. Only the Ottawa Convention started out with 57
ratifications in its first year and achieved over 100 by its third. 283 Some consider 100
ratifications a psychological threshold that, once overcome, lends additional authority to a
treaty, perhaps because 100 parties constitute a clear majority of the 192 UN member
states.284 The experience of the Chemical Weapons Convention further demonstrates that
it can take two decades or more to actually eliminate an entire category of weapons.285
Long-term thinking is therefore required when judging the impact of the TPNW.
The following maps give a clearer idea of the regional distribution of support for
the Treaty. The first map highlights the states (in blue) who voted for the Treaty’s adoption
on July 7, 2017. (The states marked in gray did not participate in the negotiations.)
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Yes
No
Abstention
Did not vote
Image 1: "UN vote on adoption of the treaty on 7 July 2017" (Source: Karte: NordNordWest, Lizenz: Creative
Commons by-sa-3.0 de, CC BY-SA 3.0 de, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60750597).

The second map highlights the signatories (in yellow) and states parties (in green)
of the Treaty as of April 2018.

Parties
Signatories
Image 2: Signatories and parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Source: By JayCoop - Own work, CC
BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=62616345)
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The two maps illustrate the concentration of support in the Global South, primarily
Latin America, Africa and South-East Asia, and reinforce the image of a treaty carried by
smaller, less influential states against the traditional centers of power. The map does not
reflect the recent ratifications by Cuba and Venezuela, soon to be followed by Brazil and
Costa Rica.286 Most of Europe, North America and the Middle East remain outside of the
Treaty, with the notable exceptions of Austria and Ireland. Both of them have already
moved far along in their parliamentary ratification processes and are expected to present
their instruments of ratification before the summer.287 In Norway, Sweden and Iceland,
parliamentary reviews are currently looking into the possibility of joining the Treaty
despite continued government opposition.288 Moreover, the Norwegian and the Dutch Red
Cross Societies participated in the negotiating conferences, a sign of strong civil society
support for the Treaty. These two National Societies also co-sponsored a conference on the
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons in Nagasaki in April 2017, together with
the Red Cross Societies of Japan, Australia and Austria. 289 Japan is an intriguing case
because of the apparent contradiction between the government’s rejection of the Treaty and
the high level of support for the elimination of nuclear weapons among the Japanese
population. While hibakusha, the Japanese survivors of the atomic bombings, publicly and
actively supported the Treaty, the Japanese government did not send a delegation to the
negotiating conferences and even voted against the draft resolution that established the
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negotiating mandate,290 supposedly in response to diplomatic pressure from the US (Japan
remains under the US nuclear umbrella). 291 Switzerland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland,
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have already shown some degree of engagement
with the humanitarian initiative. 292 In Germany, the Social Democratic Party (SPD)
endorsed the removal of US nuclear weapons from German territory in its 2017 election
program.

293

Although the conservatives won the election and lead the coalition

government, the SPD’s position signals latent approval of nuclear disarmament among the
German population. Meanwhile, support for nuclear deterrence remains strong in Eastern
Europe. NATO members in close proximity to Russia are unlikely to endorse the new
Treaty unless their allies offer them a credible alternative security guarantee.294
Chief among the Treaty’s critics are of course the NWS themselves. In a joint press
statement after the adoption of the Treaty, the P3 (US, UK, France) declared that they did
“not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it” and did not accept the notion that it
contributed in any way to the development of customary international law, on the grounds
that an accession to the Treaty would be “incompatible with the policy of nuclear
deterrence.”295 Even within this firm front of opposition, however, there are nuances to be
considered. Out of the P3, the UK has been identified as the most amenable to the TPNW

290

For the voting records on A/C.1/71/L.41 see https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/855229.
Pham, Thu-An (2018) “Reading G20 Reactions to the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/01/17/reading-g20-reactions-tonuclear-weapons-ban-treaty-pub-75279.
292
Thakur, Ramesh (2017) “The Nuclear Ban Treaty: Recasting a Normative Framework for Disarmament”
Washington Quarterly Vol. 40 (4): p. 83.
293
SPD (2017) “Zeit für mehr Gerechtigkeit. Unser Regierungsprogramm für Deutschland”:
https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/Bundesparteitag_2017/Es_ist_Zeit_fuer_mehr_GerechtigkeitUnser_Regierungsprogramm.pdf: p. 104.
294
Sauer, Tom (2017) “How will NATO’s non-nuclear members handle the UN’s ban on nuclear
weapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Vol. 73 (3): p. 180.
295
US Mission to the United Nations (2017) “Joint Press Statement from the Permanent Representatives to
the United Nations of the United States, United Kingdom, and France Following the Adoption of a Treaty
Banning Nuclear Weapons” Press release, July 7, 2017: https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7892.
291

89

for two reasons. Firstly, civil society flourishes in the UK and popular opposition to nuclear
weapons has already formed around the costly renewal of the Trident nuclear deterrent.
Anti-nuclear sentiments are particularly strong in Scotland, where the UK’s nuclear forces
are stationed. Secondly, Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, is a longstanding
supporter of nuclear disarmament. The official party line is still in favor of the Trident, but
may well be challenged by Corbyn’s supporters before the next elections. As in Norway
and the Netherlands, much depends on domestic political developments. 296 In France,
disarmament activism is much less prominent than in the UK, and nuclear weapons are
perceived more in terms of national prestige than military deterrence. According to one of
my interviewees, these circumstances will make it considerably more difficult for
humanitarian arguments to gain a foothold in France.297
Nevertheless, the TPNW holds a certain appeal for all states wishing to publicly
reaffirm their commitment to humanitarian principles and their reputation as civilized and
responsible members of the international community,298 even if it does not reflect their
current nuclear policy. This appeal is particularly strong in democratic states, where civil
society holds considerable sway, in emerging states (not to be confused with emerging
economies) wishing to raise their profile on the international stage, and in states with a
strong tradition of supporting humanitarian causes and initiatives. In illiberal states like
Russia and China, the lack of political accountability and the weakness of civil society
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make generating support for nuclear disarmament incomparably more difficult. 299 The
Russian government considers nuclear weapons crucial for its security and its standing in
the international system, and countervailing opinions are almost completely absent at all
levels of Russian society.300 China is the only NWS with a firm no-first-use policy in place
and has been considerably less vocal in its opposition to the Treaty. Despite having no
intention of giving up its nuclear weapons, the Chinese government considers that the
Treaty may serve the country’s interests in some respects, for example by strengthening
the nuclear taboo.301
Treaty implementation and related challenges
Aside from the above-mentioned hurdles regarding signature and ratification, one
of the greatest challenges the TPNW will face in the future is enforcement. Rühle, writing
for NATO, stresses the crucial role of enforcement, pointing out that ultimately, there will
always be states that are indifferent to “naming and shaming” strategies, and that only the
threat of “serious military reprisals” 302 will keep such states from breaking their
obligations. Although this statement tends towards the extreme, the Treaty text does
evidence a lack of provisions dealing with violations. Generally, norms related to
international peace and security are enforced by the UN Security Council, as illustrated by
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the Council’s recent actions in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. Regarding
the TPNW, however, the P5 as opponents of the Treaty can hardly be relied on to enforce
its provisions in the event that a rogue state should decide to ratify the Treaty and then
violate its terms.303 Even less can the P5 be expected to enforce the elimination of nuclear
weapons should one of their own ranks ever join the Treaty. Therefore, enforcement is
definitely an issue the states parties to the Treaty will have to address in the future, with a
view to finding viable alternatives to the Security Council.
Also with regards to Treaty implementation, UNODA experts underscore the
importance of the 2020 NPT Review Conference and warn that opponents of the new
Treaty will attempt to frame it as the cause for any dissent or lack of progress within the
NPT.304 It is therefore vital that the Treaty’s advocates find a constructive way of engaging
with the NPT regime, in order to strengthen the disarmament pledge of the NPT while
preventing forum-shopping by potential proliferators. The TPNW also puts pressure on the
NWS to deliver results through their preferred method of disarmament, the step-by-step
approach, in order to prevent any further erosion of the authority of the NPT.305 Looking
back to the beginning of the humanitarian initiative, the original intention of its advocates
was to engender progress in nuclear disarmament within the NPT. Only when the 2015
NPT Review Conference failed to produce any results did they contemplate creating a new
legal instrument. As Dunworth pointed out back in 2014, the NPT does not require the
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“effective measures” related to its Article VI to be carried out under its own regime.
Consequently, an overlap between the NPT and other instruments prohibiting nuclear
weapons does not undermine, but strengthen states’ legal obligations.306 In fact, this has
long been the case for regional NWFZ, whose members are also parties to the NPT and
thus under a double obligation to forego nuclear weapons. Advocates of the TPNW will
need to emphasize this point during upcoming NPT conferences to ensure that the two
treaties reinforce each other and create a joint momentum for nuclear disarmament.
Another decisive factor for the future of the Treaty is how NATO and its members
choose to engage with it. On the one hand, the prohibition against threatening the use of
nuclear weapons could be interpreted as incompatible with extended nuclear deterrence
and prevent European non-nuclear-armed NATO members from joining the TPNW. On
the other hand, NATO members have always had different national views and practices in
relation to nuclear weapons. In the past, the organization has accommodated these
differences and adapted its operations accordingly. Since there is no mention of nuclear
weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty itself, the organization could accommodate members
wishing to join the TPNW if the new Treaty is interpreted as compatible with NATO
membership.307 So far, however, the alliance has been firm in its opposition to the Treaty,
accusing its facilitators of undermining the NPT and even suggesting that nuclear abolition
may be immoral if it makes major war more likely. Disarmament demands directed at the
P3 have been deflected by claims that the real danger does not come from their extensive
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arsenals, but rather from “those of some smaller countries.”308 Ultimately, the alliance’s
future attitude towards the Treaty may be defined by the choices made by NATO’s nonnuclear members and by their ability and willingness to withstand diplomatic pressure from
the P3.309
Last but not least, the private sector must be taken into account when discussing
the implementation of the Treaty. At a time when business ethics are gaining in importance
and banks and investors are increasingly concerned about their reputations, they might be
deterred from investing in the nuclear weapons industry as the stigma attached to nuclear
weapons grows.310 Even though a clear prohibition on financing nuclear weapons was not
achieved, the Treaty’s advocates should engage the private sector and especially the
financial sector with regards to the ongoing nuclear weapons modernization programs.
Impact and achievements
With the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW, NNWS found a way to reclaim
agency in nuclear disarmament. After decades of inertia and empty promises under the
NPT, NNWS chose an alternative approach and did what lay within their power – they
initiated a normative shift in order to gradually diminish the political utility of nuclear
weapons and raise the reputational cost of their possession and use. Although the Treaty
does not prohibit non-states parties from possessing and using nuclear weapons, its
normative nature and deliberate humanitarian underpinning will eventually affect the
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behavior of those states by creating a compliance pull.311 According to Realist IR theory,
states will always act in their own self-interest. Indeed, the Treaty’s advocates do not
expect NWS to renounce their nuclear weapons for idealistic or ethical reasons. The
compliance pull is intended to work in a more roundabout way, changing the incentive
structures to the point where nuclear weapons carry such a strong stigma that it will be in
states’ self-interest to give them up. While the NWS hold a great deal of power within the
international system, Hedley Bull’s much-cited definition of great powers demonstrates
that power does not exist in a vacuum and is a psychological as well as a physical construct:
“[G]reat powers are powers recognised by others to have […] certain special rights and
duties.”312 The P5 choose to interpret the NPT as supposedly recognizing their special right
to possess nuclear weapons. Once the TPNW enters into force, however, this right will be
officially called into question. Therefore, the TPNW can be credited for creating new
incentives for nuclear disarmament and reenergizing a process that had previously reached
an impasse.
Another major achievement of the humanitarian initiative is that it has
democratized nuclear disarmament by bringing previously disenfranchised groups into the
process. This democratization took place on several levels. At the inter-state level, NNWS
assumed agency and refused to play by the unequal rules of the NPT any longer. At the
level of disarmament fora, NGOs were invited to participate and indeed played a leading
role in the humanitarian initiative. At the national level, activists mobilized civil society
and prompted citizens to take an interest in their countries’ nuclear policy. Previously,
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NWS effectively shielded nuclear decision-making from public oversight by labelling it a
national security issue. With the reframing of nuclear weapons as an issue of human
security and human survival, this taboo was broken and citizens are increasingly aware that
nuclear disarmament is a global public good. 313 The TPNW has further democratized
nuclear disarmament by placing all states on an equal footing. Majority-based voting
systems were applied throughout the Treaty process, giving each participating state the
same voting power, and the same conditions were set for all states – no nuclear weapons,
no privileges, no exceptions. These principles of inclusiveness and sovereign equality pose
a special incentive for smaller and less influential states to join. Where the P5 and other
powerful states are concerned, the Treaty must rely solely on its humanitarian appeal to
bring them to the table.
In the near future, one of the most important tasks for disarmament activists will be
keeping the debate alive and maintaining the attention of the international community that
the signing of the Treaty and the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony have generated. Now that
the Treaty is a fait accompli and resistance against its creation is no longer an issue, Treaty
advocates have the opportunity to refocus the discussion on the humanitarian consequences
of nuclear weapons.
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Unfortunately, the United Nations high-level international

conference on nuclear disarmament scheduled for the spring of 2018 as a follow-up to the
2013 high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament hosted by the NAM has been postponed
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indefinitely due to conflicting interests among the organizers.315 Against this backdrop,
civil society action is more important than ever for Treaty implementation. ICAN has been
actively engaged in analyses similar to the one conducted in this chapter, with the aim of
understanding state positions and levels of support. The next step in ICAN’s strategic
planning is to identify those states most likely to be won over and the pressure points that
could tip the scale. Funds from the Nobel Peace Prize award are put towards grants to
partner organizations in key countries. In signatory states, ICAN partners assist national
lawmakers with the drafting of legislation in order to speed up the ratification process. 316
Prior to the NPT Preparatory Committee session in Geneva from April 23 to May 4, 2018,
ICAN held a two-day campaigners’ meeting, consulting with NGO partners on the best
ways to engage member state delegations, parliamentarians and civil society in each target
state.317 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is similarly engaged
through its National Societies. If like-minded states and civil society groups continue to
harness the advocacy networks they built during the humanitarian initiative and maintain
their level of engagement and cooperation, the Treaty is well on its way towards entering
into force within the coming year.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The present thesis has examined the humanitarian impact initiative in nuclear
disarmament, relying on a combination of official documents and records, academic
literature, civil society publications and interviews conducted by the author, and going
beyond a simple recounting of events to take a closer look at the strategies that made the
initiative successful and the actors who drove it forward. The humanitarian initiative and
the resulting Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons broke new ground in several
areas: Its architects created renewed momentum in nuclear disarmament by moving the
discussion into fora more conducive to dialogue and progress – independent international
conferences and the UN General Assembly. This opened up the field of nuclear
disarmament to the participation of a wider range of actors, notably NGOs and other civil
society organizations. Another important component was the reframing of nuclear
disarmament as a humanitarian concern, based on well-designed discourse and advocacy
strategies. The analysis in Chapters Four to Six found that the active and constructive
collaboration and exchange between state and civil society actors was a crucial factor for
the success of the humanitarian initiative. The resulting network of small states, states of
the Global South and civil society organizations achieved what would have been
unthinkable a decade ago – a multilateral treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons. A closer look
at the negotiating conferences revealed an open and participatory drafting process and an
unusually swift conclusion of the negotiations. Although the Treaty, which is currently in
its ratification phase, faces a number of challenges, notably the continuing opposition of
the nuclear powers and their allies, its achievements cannot be overlooked and will shape
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the future debate on nuclear disarmament as well as the cost-and benefit calculations of the
NWS.
The Treaty and the humanitarian initiative can also be viewed in a larger context of
power and accountability. Recent years have seen increasingly successful efforts to hold
the powerful accountable, be it for government corruption, sexual misconduct or, in the
case of the nuclear-armed states, the continued non-fulfilment of disarmament obligations.
States and citizens who had previously been excluded from the nuclear weapons debate
became crucial actors and called entrenched great-power privileges into question. By
basing their arguments on the principles of international humanitarian law, the Treaty’s
advocates made it difficult for countries wishing to be perceived as civilized and
responsible members of the international community to dismiss them. In the past, it was
the US and Western European states who frequently instrumentalized their moral authority
for political ends. With the humanitarian initiative, states of the Global South effectively
claimed the moral high ground for themselves and called out the NWS on their unfulfilled
NPT obligations.
The findings of the present thesis are relevant for both scholars and practitioners of
international relations. From an academic perspective, the analysis in Chapter Six adds
nuance to the discussion on the TAN (transnational advocacy network) theory. More
generally, the thesis contributes to the documentation and academic review of the Treaty
negotiations and the multilateral process that preceded them. For diplomats and activists,
there are lessons to be learned about the successful reshaping of the political and
institutional environment around an issue, the importance of coordination and exchange
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between like-minded actors, and the crucial role of perceptions and ethics in international
relations.
Since the TPNW was concluded very recently, research on the subject is only now
being published and there are numerous aspects left to be explored. Gathering a greater
number of oral accounts and personal notes could shed more light on the negotiations that
took place behind closed doors, and a more detailed examination of the concrete
contributions of each state and civil society organization could reveal more about
negotiation dynamics and levels of influence. Furthermore, the Treaty will have to be
reexamined in the light of changing political circumstances and crucial events that might
reshape its future, such as the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
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